NJ 1995, 462

EUROPEES HOF VOOR DE RECHTEN VAN DE MENS (kamer)

19 april 1994, CEDH Série A Vol. 288

(Ryssdal, Martens, Foighel, Pekkanen, Loizou, Morenilla, Bigi, Mifsud Bonnici, Makarczyk; m.nt. EAA)
m.nt. EAA

Regeling

EVRM art. 6 lid 1, 50

Essentie

Procedure voor College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven. Geen behandeling door een onafhankelijke rechter. Schending art. 6 lid 1 EVRM.

Procedure voor CBB / geen behandeling door onafhankelijke rechter / schending 6 lid 1 EVRM

Samenvatting

De bevoegdheid om een bindende uitspraak te doen die niet gewijzigd kan worden door een niet-rechterlijk orgaan ten nadele van een individuele partij, ligt besloten in de notie van een ‘tribunal’ in de zin van art. 6 (§ 45).

De vraag of voldaan is aan de vereisten van art. 6 kan niet alleen beoordeeld worden aan de hand van de kansen van de klager op succes, aangezien deze bepaling niet een bepaalde uitkomst garandeert (§ 47).

Art. 74 Wet Arbo, zoals van kracht tot 1 jan. 1994, gaf de Kroon de bevoegdheid om de gevolgen van de uitspraken van het College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven geheel of gedeeltelijk ongedaan te maken. Hiermee ontbrak een van de hoofdkenmerken van een ‘tribunal’ in de zin van art. 6. Een gebrek van deze aard kan hersteld worden door een er op volgende herziening door een rechterlijke instantie die wel alle garanties van art. 6 biedt (§ 52).

De door de regering naar voren gebrachte remedies — nieuwe behandeling door het College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven of een beroep op de burgerlijke rechter — zouden een dergelijk herstel echter niet hebben kunnen brengen (§ 54). Schending van het vereiste van behandeling door een rechter in de zin van art. 6 lid 1 EVRM (§ 55).

Klager had voldoende gelegenheid om zijn argumenten naar voren te brengen. Geen schending van het beginsel van ‘equality of arms’ (§ 57).

Art. 6 lid 1 verplicht de rechter zijn beslissing te motiveren, maar vereist niet een gedetailleerd antwoord op ieder argument. Het is geen taak voor het Hof om te onderzoeken of argumenten voldoende weerlegd zijn. De uitspraak van het College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven is voldoende gemotiveerd. Geen schending van het vereiste van een eerlijke behandeling in de zin van art. 6 lid 1 (§ 61).

Materiële schadeclaim van de klager gebaseerd op de vooronderstelling dat de uitspraak van het College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven gunstig voor de klager geweest zou zijn, indien wel voldaan was aan de garanties van art. 6 lid 1 (§ 63). Het Hof wijst deze claim af, aangezien dit allerminst vast staat (§ 64). Wel gedeeltelijke kostenvergoeding (§ 66, 67).

Partijen

Van de Hurk,

tegen

Nederland.

Tekst

Feiten

De klager is een in 1945 geboren Nederlandse melkveehouder.

Bij de Beschikking Superheffing van 18 april 1984 (gepubliceerd in Staatscourant nr. 79 van 19 april 1984) kreeg Van de Hurk een melkquotum opgelegd. Bij overschrijding van dit quotum was een bijkomende belasting verschuldigd.

Op 29 juni 1984 diende de klager een claim in voor een hoger melkquotum bij de districtsbureauhouder van de Stichting tot Uitvoering van Landbouwmaatregelen in Noord-Brabant. Hij stelde dat hij verplichtingen was aangegaan om te investeren in de verbouwing en uitbreiding van zijn koeienstal.

De districtsbureauhouder stuurde de claim door naar de directeur voor de landbouw en voedselvoorziening van de provincie Noord-Brabant. Laatstgenoemde wees de claim op 1 nov. 1984 af, aangezien de klager niet had aangetoond dat het altijd zijn bedoeling was geweest om het aantal standplaatsen voor melkkoeien uit te breiden.

Op 27 nov. 1984 heeft de klager bezwaar gemaakt tegen deze beslissing bij de minister van Landbouw en Visserij, die het bezwaarschrift op 11 nov. 1985 heeft verworpen.

De klager ging op 3 dec. 1985 in beroep bij het College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven (verder: het College). Met een brief die op 30 dec. 1986 de griffie van het College bereikte wendde Van de Hurk zich tot de voorzitter van dit College voor een voorlopige voorziening met als effect dat hij voorlopig geen bijkomende belasting hoefde te betalen.

Na een openbare behandeling en het horen van de minister van Landbouw en Visserij en de klager heeft de voorzitter de gevraagde voorlopige voorziening op 7 juli 1987 afgewezen, aangezien het op het eerste gezicht niet waarschijnlijk was dat het College de beslissing van de minister opzij zou zetten.

Bij brief van 25 sept. 1987 heeft de klager de griffie van het College laten weten de procedure te willen voortzetten.

Op 16 juni 1989 heeft het College het beroep van de klager afgewezen.

Nationale recht

Art. 74 lid 1 Wet administratieve rechtspraak bedrijfsorganisatie (Wet Arbo) luidde tot 1 jan. 1994 (inwerkingtreding van de Algemene wet bestuursrecht) als volgt:

Indien een uitspraak naar Ons oordeel in haar gevolgen in strijd komt met het algemeen belang, kunnen Wij op voordracht van Onze betrokken Ministers besluiten, dat zij geen gevolg of niet volledig gevolg zal hebben.

Procedure voor de Commissie

Van de Hurk diende op 1 dec. 1989 een klacht in bij de Europese Commissie voor de rechten van de mens te Straatsburg. Hij stelde dat art. 6 lid 1 Europees Verdrag tot bescherming van de rechten van de mens en de fundamentele vrijheden (EVRM) geschonden was, aangezien hij geen behandeling van zijn zaak door een onafhankelijke en onpartijdige rechter had gehad. Daarnaast beweerde hij onvoldoende mogelijkheid te hebben gehad om zijn argumenten naar voren te brengen en dat het College niet of niet voldoende was ingegaan op de door hem naar voren gebrachte argumenten.

De Commissie heeft de klacht ontvankelijk verklaard op 8 jan. 1992. In haar rapport van 10 dec. 1992 (ex art. 31 EVRM) was de Commissie met twaalf stemmen tegen vijf van mening dat art. 6 lid 1 EVRM geschonden was.

De Commissie legde de zaak op 13 febr. 1993 voor aan het Hof, de Nederlandse regering deed dit op 11 maart 1993.

As to the law

I

Alleged violations of Article 6 § 1

42

According to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention,

In the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by an independent … tribunal …

43

The present case concerns the ‘determination of civil rights and obligations’ so that Article 6 § 1 is applicable; indeed, this was not disputed.

1. Independent tribunal

44

The applicant alleged that his case had not been determined by an ‘independent tribunal’ as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, since section 74 of the Industrial Appeals Act allowed the Crown to decide that judgments of the Tribunal should not be implemented.

The Government contested this allegation, whereas the Commission accepted it.

45

In the Court’s opinion, the power to give a binding decision which may not be altered by a non-judicial authority to the detriment of an individual party is inherent in the very notion of a ‘tribunal’, as is confirmed by the word ‘determination’ (‘qui décidera’) (compare the following judgments: Benthem v. the Netherlands, 23 October 1985, Series A no. 97, p. 17, § 40 ( NJ 1986, 102, m.nt. EAA; red.); H. v. Belgium, 30 November 1987, Series A no. 127, p. 34, § 50; and Belilos v. Switzerland, 29 April 1988, Series A no. 132, p. 29, § 64). This power can also be seen as a component of the ‘independence’ required by Article 6 § 1.

46

The applicant, while admitting that the Government in defending cases before the Industrial Appeals Tribunal never referred to their powers under section 74 of the Industrial Appeals Act, maintained that the mere existence of that power impaired that tribunal’s independence, since it clearly influenced its decisions. This, he alleged, was shown by the fact — which as such was not denied by the Government — that of the many thousands of appeals lodged with the Tribunal by dairy farmers concerning the application of the Ordinance on the Additional Levy only a very limited proportion — no more than 2% — had been successful. It was suggested by the applicant that in deciding these cases the Tribunal had borne in mind the possibility of the Crown exercising its powers under section 74.

47

The Court finds that there is nothing in the information at its disposal to indicate that the mere existence of the Crown’s powers under section 74 had any influence on the way the Tribunal handled and decided the cases which came before it. In particular, no significance can be attributed to the low success rate of appeals against decisions taken under the Ordinance on the Additional Levy. Whether or not the requirements of Article 6 have been met cannot be assessed with reference to the applicant’s chances of success alone, since this provision does not guarantee any particular outcome (see, inter alia and mutatis mutandis, the Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 March 1993, Series A no. 247–C, p. 62, § 40).

48

In the Government’s view, the existence of the Crown’s powers under section 74 was no obstacle to classifying the Industrial Appeals Tribunal as a ‘tribunal’, since section 74 did not confer upon the Crown to overturn the Tribunal’s judgments as regards their reasoning, but merely the possibility of blocking their consequences if they ran counter to the general interest.

In addition, section 74 of the Industrial Appeals Act was in any event a dead letter. They emphasised that no use had ever been made of that provision and that it was due to be repealed when the new General Administrative Code entered into force on 1 January 1994.

49

As to the first argument, the Court, while accepting that section 74 may be construed as suggested by the Government, points out that for an individual litigant it is the consequences of litigation — the operative provisions of a judgment — which are of importance; the actual content of his civil rights and obligations is determined by those provisions.

50

Nor can it be accepted that section 74 had lost all legal significance. Like the Commission, the Court cannot disregard the fact that section 74 was still law at the time of the events complained of and for several years thereafter. There was nothing to prevent the Crown (in the person of the Minister of Agriculture, Nature Conservancy and Fisheries) from availing itself of the powers thereby conferred upon it had it considered such a course of action necessary or desirable in view of what it might perceive as the general interest (see, mutatis mutandis, the De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v. the Netherlands judgment of 22 May 1984, Series A no. 77, p. 24, § 48(NJ 1986, 507, m.nt. EAA; red.); and the Modinos v. Cyprus judgment of 22 April 1993, Series A no. 259, p. 11, § 23).

51

In this context the Government appear to contend, moreover, that had the Crown ever made use of its powers under Article 74, the individual concerned could have sought review of the resulting decision in the civil courts.

In the absence of any clear statutory provision and of any domestic case-law on this issue — the Crown never having made use of the said powers — the Court is unable to verify the existence and effectiveness of such a remedy.

52

It follows that at the material time Article 74 of the Industrial Appeals Act, which remained in force until 1 January 1994, allowed the Minister partially or completely to deprive a judgment of the Tribunal of its effect to the detriment of an individual party. One of the basic attributes of a ‘tribunal’ was therefore missing.

A defect of this nature may, however, be remedied by the availability of a form of subsequent review by a judicial body that affords all the guarantees required by Article 6 (see, as recent authorities and mutatis mutandis, the following judgments: 24 August 1993, Nortier v. the Netherlands, Series A no. 267, § 36; 25 November 1993, Holm v. Sweden, Series A no. 279–A, § 33).

53

The Government maintained that such a review was in fact available.

Firstly, section 75 of the Industrial Appeals Act allowed for the possibility of a retrial by the Industrial Appeals Tribunal itself. The Government pointed out that — since the original judgment remained binding, at any rate in so far as it established that the originally impugned decision of the government body was unlawful — such a retrial would necessarily lead to a judgment ordering the government body to pay damages and stressed that paragrph 5 of Article 74 made it clear that the Crown had no power to set aside judgments requiring the government body to pay damages.

In the second place, the Government suggested that since the Convention was directly applicable in the Netherlands, the applicant could — under well-established principles of Netherlands law (see the Oerlemans v. the Netherlands judgment of 27 November 1991, Series A no. 219, p. 22, § 57 ( NJ 1992, 666, m.nt. EJD; red.) — have taken his case to the civil courts on the ground that the Industrial Appeals Tribunal could not be considered an independent tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.

54

The Court is not convinced by these arguments.

As to the first remedy, the Court notes that section 75 of the Industrial Appeals Act did not allow the Tribunal to depart from the Crown’s decision under section 74. To that extent the possibility of a retrial can hardly be considered an effective remedy within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 52 above. Moreover, although it is true that section 75 allowed for compensation in the event of the Crown’s using its powers under section 74, compensation cannot be equated with advantages obtained under an original judgment of the Industrial Appeals Tribunal ordering a government body to take a specific decision in favour of the party seeking review.

As to the second remedy, its effectiveness is open to doubt. The Government themselves have stated that on the few occasions when the question was addressed by the civil courts, it was held that the Tribunal ’(afforded) sufficient guarantees of judicial review’ (see the Oerlemans judgment referred to above, ibid.).

55

There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 in that the applicant’s civil rights and obligations were not ‘determined’ by a ‘tribunal’.

1. Fairness of proceedings

56

The applicant complained that while Article 6 § 2 of the 1984 Ordinance required him to produce all his arguments and his evidence at the outset, his opponent — the Minister — had been able to change his arguments to suit his position as the case evolved. The rejection by the Director of Agriculture and Food Supply of the applicant’s initial request for a larger reference quantity of milk was based on the consideration that he had failed to show ‘that it had always been his intention to increase the number of stands for milch cows’; the Minister’s dismissal of his objection was grounded on an alleged insufficient increase in the number of cow stands for milch cows and cows in calf. Before the Tribunal, however, the Minister had based his case on the allegation that his investments had fallen short of the figure required. Accordingly there was a violation of the principle of ‘equality of arms’ enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

57

Firstly, this complaint overlooks the fact that section 51 of the Industrial Appeals Act meets the requirement of ‘equality of arms’ in that it allows both parties to the proceedings before the Industrial Appeals Tribunal to ‘alter their claim or their defence and the grounds advanced in support thereof’. Furthermore, the complaint does not take into account the fact that, although in the proceedings before the Industrial Appeals Tribunal the Minister, making use of the opportunity afforded him under section 51, did indeed base his case on new arguments which differed from those on which he had founded his original refusal of the applicant’s request, the applicant was allowed to submit, inter alia, a report by his accountant as well as counter-arguments. Therefore, not only did the applicant have a genuine opportunity to respond (see the Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain judgment of 23 June 1993, Series A no. 262 (NJ 1995, 397 m.nt. EJD; red.), § 63) but he actually did so. No breach of the principle of ‘equality of arms’ is therefore established.

58

With reference to the fact that the Tribunal had refused to consider the price per square metre referable to the increase in the number of cow stands for milch cows and cows in calf which he had submitted at its hearing, the applicant claimed further that his case had not been dealt with ‘fairly’.

59

The effect of Article 6 § 1 is, inter alia, to place the ‘tribunal’ under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision (see the Kraska v. Switzerland judgment of 19 April 1993, Series A no. 254–B, p. 49, § 30). It has to be determined whether this condition was satisfied in the instant case.

60

The Tribunal based its assessment on the price per square metre provided by the applicant himself previously, in his written pleadings, and which followed from calculations on which the applicant had relied in the proceedings before the President of the Tribunal. It chose to apply to this figure a method of calculation different from that advocated by the applicant and thereby arrived at a result which was not favourable to him. It is not for the Court to criticise this choice; as a general rule, the assessment of the facts is within the province of the national courts (see, as the most recent authority, the Dombo Beheer BV v. the Netherlands judgment of 27 October 1993, Series A no. 274 (NJ 1995, 534 m.nt. HJS en EJD; red.), § 31).

It is true that the Tribunal refused to consider the applicant’s new figure. However, he only produced it at the latest possible stage, namely at the oral hearing after the Minister had responded in writing to his written pleadings.

Given these circumstances, the refusal of the Tribunal to consider the applicant’s new figure does not constitute a violation of Article 6 § 1.

61

The applicant lastly brought forward a series of grievances which may be summarised as a complaint that in its judgment the Industrial Appeals Tribunal did not, or not sufficiently, deal with various arguments advanced by him.

Article 6 § 1 obliges courts to give reasons for their decisions, but cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument. Nor is the European Court called upon to examine whether arguments are adequately met.

Making a general assessment, the Court does not find that the judgment of the Industrial Appeals Tribunal is insufficiently reasoned. Consequently no violation of Article 6 § 1 is established in this respect either.

II

Application of Article 50

62

Under Article 50 of the Convention,

If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the … Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of the decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.

1. Pecuniary damage

63

The applicant claimed a total of NLG 622 137 for loss of business, in addition to compensation for the levy-free quantity which in his contention had been wrongly denied him and the value of which at 1 July 1993 he put at NLG 397 952. The total claimed thus came to NLG 1 020 089. He submitted extensive and detailed calculations based on the situation which would have existed had the extra reference quantity in fact been allowed.

64

This claim is based on the assumption that the judgment of the Tribunal would have been favourable to the applicant had the alleged violations of Article 6 § 1 not taken place. However, it is by no means clear that the outcome of the case would have been different in the absence of the violation found (see paragraph 55 above). The Court therefore agrees with the Delegate of the Commission and the Government that the applicant’s claim under this head must be dismissed.

1. Costs and expenses

65

The applicant did not receive legal aid before either the Commission or the Court. He claimed reimbursement of lawyer’s fees ‘directly connected with the present proceedings’ (which the Court takes to mean the Strasbourg proceedings). Up to the hearing, they were estimated to have amounted to two hundred hours at NLG 265 an hour for counsel’s fees, i.e. a total of NLG 53 000, excluding value-added tax; the travel and accommodation expenses incurred through attendance at the hearing itself would have to be added.

The Delegate of the Commission considered that the applicant was entitled to reimbursement of expenses incurred in presenting his case before the Convention institutions. The Government considered the amount of time spent on the case ‘unreasonable’.

66

It is reiterated that legal costs are only recoverable in so far as they relate to the violation found (see, inter alia, the Pham Hoang v. France judgment of 25 September 1992, Series A no. 243, § 46). Although the applicant also alleged a lack of fairness in the proceedings, he concentrated on the question in respect of which a violation has been found. The Court therefore finds it reasonable to award the applicant a sum of NLG 35 000 together with any value-added tax that may be chargeable.

67

No particulars were provided regarding travel and accommodation expenses. However, the Court finds it reasonable to award the applicant an amount equal to that which would have been due to him under the legal aid scheme to cover these costs for himself and his representative, namely FRF 6336.

For these reasons, the Court

1

Holds by six votes to three that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 in that the applicant’s civil rights and obligations were not ‘determined’ by a ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of that provision;

2

Holds unanimously that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 as regards the requirements of fairness of proceedings;

3

Holds by eight votes to one that the respondent State is to pay to the applicant, within three months, 35 000 (thirty-five thousand) Netherlands guilders, together with any value-added tax which may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses, to which is to be added 6336 (six thousand three hundred and thirty-six) French francs to be converted into Netherlands currency at the rate of exchange applicable on the date of delivery of this judgment;

4

Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.

Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Martens

I

Introduction

1

Like the majority I am of the opinion that section 74 of the 1954 Act is incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention. However, I find myself unable to accept that this justifies the finding that in the present case there has been a violation of that Article in that the applicant’s civil rights and obligations were not ‘determined’ by a ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of that provision.

2

I note that the Court apparently holds that the present case calls for an exception to its established case-law, according to which ‘in principle it does not suffice for an individual applicant to claim that the mere existence of a law violates his rights under the Convention’* [1] . Section 74 of the 1954 Act was not applied to the detriment of the applicant — indeed section 74 was never applied at any time during the forty years that it remained ‘on the statute book’* [2]  — but the Court considers its mere existence sufficient to find a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

In itself this approach is in line with the one I have consistently advocated even in cases where the complaint was that the application of a certain provision violated rights under the Convention* [3] . I feel, however, that the Court should have given reasons for this exceptional approach to the present case.

II

The nature of the violation of Article 6

3

One of the essential problems in this case is the nature of the violation of Article 6.

The applicant contended that the mere existence of the Crown’s powers under section 74 impaired the independence of the Industrial Appeals Tribunal, since it clearly influenced its decisions. I entirely concur in the Court’s rejection of that argument* [4] .

For its part the Court concentrates on the notion of a ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and concludes that, because of the Crown’s power under section 74, the Industrial Appeals Tribunal did not meet all the requirements implied in that notion. In order to justify this conclusion, the Court reads into the notion a requirement which is ‘new’ in the sense that it had not been made explicit in the Court’s case-law referred to in paragraph 45 of the judgment: for a court to be considered a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6, it does not suffice for it to have the power to give a binding decision; it is moreover required that such a decision ‘may not be altered by a non-judicial authority to the detriment of an individual party’ (see paragraph 45 of the Court’s judgment — emphasis mine).

The reference to ‘an individual party’ reveals that this extra requirement has been created for the nonce and that is, perhaps, why it failed to persuade me to share the Court’s opinion that the Industrial Appeals Tribunal — which I hold in esteem — is deficient in that it cannot even be considered a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6.

4

In my opinion there is nothing amiss with the Industrial Appeals Tribunal. There is, however, a violation of Article 6 because section 74 is incompatible with the fundamental principle of the rule of law which Article 6 is intended to enshrine* [5] .

Let me try to explain.

Section 74 of the 1954 Act was a safety-valve to be used only in very exceptional cases. The perceived need for this safety-valve was understandable, not only in view of the very wide powers given to the Industrial Appeals Tribunal at a time when the Netherlands still had very little experience with administrative tribunals, but also in view of the fact that originally the Industrial Appeals Tribunal heard appeals only against decisions and acts of economic regulatory bodies set up under the Industrial Organisation Act (Wet op de Bedrijfsorganisatie)* [6] . It is understandable that the legislature should have feared at the time that those lower bodies, when presenting their case before the Industrial Appeals Tribunal, might very well take a view of ‘the general interest’ which differed from that of central Government, so that the latter ought to have an opportunity to intervene if the ‘general interest’ as they saw it was endangered by the Industrial Appeals Tribunal’s ruling.

Indeed, it is quite conceivable that the ‘general interest’ justifies deciding that although an administrative decision detrimental to an individual’s ‘civil rights’* [7]  was unlawful, the individual concerned should not be entitled to restitutio in integrum but only to compensation* [8] .

However, under the rule of law it is essentially for the judiciary — and not the executive — to decide in the last resort whether an injured individual’s civil rights should be subordinated to the ‘general interest’* [9] :

The rule of law implies, inter alia, that an interference by the executive authorities with an individual’s rights should be subject to an effective control which should normally be assured by the judiciary, at least in the last resort, judicial control offering the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure.

The fundamental flaw of section 74 and the essence of its incompatibility with Article 6 of the Convention is therefore that it assigns this decision to the Crown* [10] .

Had the power under section 74 ever been used, it would have violated the principle of ‘equality of arms’ and would have undermined the confidence which the courts should inspire in a democratic society. The above analysis shows, however, that section 74 violates Article 6 § 1 of the Convention per se, quite apart from whether it is used or not.

5

Even when the original Bill was introduced in the 1950s, the incompatibility of section 74 with the principle of the rule of law was noticed both outside* [11]  and inside Parliament. Nearly all those who took part in the debate on the Bill mentioned the point. Those who took the view (in some instances with considerable hesitation) that — as most of the speakers put it — ‘the Government’s power to decree that certain decisions of the Industrial Appeals Tribunal (would) have no effect’* [12]  was not incompatible with the rule of law based that opinion on the understanding that the requirements of that principle were less strict in the field of administrative law than in that of civil law* [13] . Their opponents — who were in a minority — disagreed. The spokesman for the latter (a renowned professor of private international law at Leiden University) said in this context:

According to the prevailing view … there is no place for judicial proceedings in the proper sense of the word in the field of public law. I consider this wrong in principle, since it is in the nature of things that judicial proceedings are an inherent part of the rule of law and it is only by them that the power of public authority is subjected to the law. Only by them can a fair balance between private and general interests truly be ensured.* [14]

I cannot refrain from including one more quotation from his speech, not only because it has a remarkably modern flavour but also because it well illustrates the point that I am trying to make:

In my opinion, what is at issue here is the proper balance between the judiciary and the Government, between the concrete legal situation determined by the judiciary and the exercise of the Government’s responsibility. If this view is taken of their interrelationship, one can discern no good reason why the Government should independently enforce the exercise of their responsibility in a way directly opposed to the decision of the judiciary.

On the contrary, it might be argued that under the rule of law the decision of the judiciary should be allowed to prevail, since it must be accepted that such a decision will in certain cases be detrimental to the general interest.* [15]

6

Criticism of section 74 never subsided. Again and again leading commentators on administrative law have condemned section 74 as unacceptable* [16] . Some of these critical comments date from after the Court’s judgment in the Benthem v. the Netherlands case (23 October 1985, Series A no. 97)* [17] , but several antedate that landmark decision. Van der Burg and Cartigny* [18]  criticised the Crown’s power under section 74 as ‘half-hearted and inconsistent’, Tak and Ten Berge* [19]  described it as ‘questionable’ and Stroink* [20]  as ‘scandalous’, whilst Hirsch Ballin (the present Minister of Justice), analysing the inferences to be drawn from Article 6 of the Convention* [21] , confined himself to saying that this power allowed independent decisions of the Industrial Appeals Tribunal to be interfered with and recommended that this provision should be amended ‘if it (was) necessary to maintain it at all’.

This persistent criticism of section 74 highlights the fact that it has never been repealed. In 1984 the Minister of Justice cautiously said: ‘One might even venture to suggest that the scheme of sections 74 and 75 has become a dead letter’* [22]  but, although he said this when introducing a Bill to amend the 1954 Act, he was very careful not to propose repealing the controversial provisions! Nor were they immediately repealed as a result of the Benthem judgment. Does this not suggest that the Government wished not only to retain their power under section 74 but also to reserve the right to use it?* [23]

III

Is the applicant a ‘victim’?

7

It is surprising that the Government did not at any stage of the proceedings contend that the applicant could not properly claim to be a ‘victim’ of any violation, section 74 not having been applied to his detriment.

That curious omission should not, however, have prevented the Court from examining proprio motu whether or not the applicant had the standing to complain about the incompatibility of section 74 of the 1954 Act with Article 6 of the Convention. The requirement of the status of ‘victim’ is not merely a question of admissibility but rather a question of competence. A respondent State may waive reliance on the preliminary objection that the application was filed out of time or that domestic remedies were not exhausted, but cannot, by not raising the question of victim status, create competence where that is lacking. After all, Article 25 of the Convention ‘does not institute for individuals a kind of actio popularis for the interpretation of the Convention; it does not permit individuals to complain against a law in abstracto simply because they feel that it contravenes the Convention’* [24] .

8

Quaeritur ergo: is the applicant to be considered a ‘victim’ on account of the mere existence of a provision of national law that is incompatible with the Convention, even though section 74 was not applied to his detriment?

In answering this question I recall, firstly, that there are undoubtedly cases in which the very existence of certain provisions of national law affects an individual so continuously, directly and distressingly that he is to be considered a victim. In this respect it is sufficient to refer to the Marckx v. Belgium judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, and especially to the judgments in the cases concerning homosexuals and transsexuals* [25] . It goes without saying that the present case does not fall into that category.

The next point to be made is that it has not been disputed that the Industrial Appeals Tribunal possesses all the relevant characteristics of the judicial function as hitherto defined in the Court’s case-law* [26] . It is in fact clear that the 1954 Act* [27]  conferred on the Industrial Appeals Tribunal the power to decide cases within its competence on the basis of rules of law and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner. Nor has it been contested that as far as the manner of appointment of its members and their terms of office are concerned and with regard to the guarantees afforded by its procedure, the Industrial Appeals Tribunal fully meets the requirements of an independent tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. Furthermore, the Court has found (see paragraph 47 of its judgment)

that there is nothing in the information at its disposal to indicate that the mere existence of the Crown’s powers under section 74 had any influence on the way the Tribunal handled and decided the cases which came before it.

The conclusion must be that for all practical purposes the applicant’s relevant civil rights were determined in conformity with Article 6* [28] .

In other words, the applicant did not suffer any other harm than that of having to litigate before a jurisdiction handing down decisions which in theory — should the Crown use the power which, contrary to the principle of the rule of law, had been conferred upon it by section 74 — might be subject to change in the manner indicated in paragraph 54 of the Court’s judgment, that is, that it might not entitle the applicant to a specific new administrative decision in his favour but only to compensation. It is true that the Court’s case-law the mere risk of being directly and detrimentally affected by the application of the impugned decision of national law may suffice to qualify a person as a ‘victim’* [29] , but, firstly, the risk that after more than thirty years the Crown should suddenly use the impugned power to prevent the applicant from being allowed a larger levy-free quantity of milk was infinitesimal, and, secondly, even if that risk had materialised, the applicant would nevertheless not have suffered any prejudice whatsoever, since any damage caused by a refusal to increase a levy-free quantity of milk is by its nature capable of being fully made good by financial compensation.

9

In sum: I cannot but conclude that in view of the fact that section 74 was not applied to the detriment of the applicant, he cannot be considered a ‘victim’ of the fact that this provision of Netherlands law was incompatible with the fundamental principle of the rule of law and consequently violated Article 6 of the Convention.

IV

Conclusion

10

In view of my finding that the applicant lacks the required status of ‘victim’ I had no other choice than to vote against point 1 of the operative provisions of the Court’s judgment, even though I too am of the opinion that section 74 of the 1954 Act was incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention.

Noot

Dit arrest betreft de rechtmatigheid van de procedure voorzien in de artt. 74 en 75 Wet administratieve rechtspraak bedrijfsorganisatie (1954). Deze wet is met de inwerkingtreding van de Algemene wet bestuursrecht op 1 januari 1994 vervangen door de Wet bestuursrechtspraak bedrijfsorganisatie. De bepalingen zijn dus vervallen. Zij maakten de Kroon bevoegd om, wanneer zij een uitspraak van het CBvB in strijd met het algemeen belang oordeelde, te besluiten dat de uitspraak geheel of ten dele geen gevolg zou hebben. Het College kon vervolgens op verzoek van betrokkene opnieuw recht doen met inachtneming van het besluit van de Kroon of het overheidslichaam tot een schadevergoeding veroordelen.

Nu de omstreden wetsbepalingen inmiddels vervangen waren, behoefde het Europese Hof zich niet te bekommeren over eventuele nakoming van zijn arrest. Wellicht om die reden maakt het in § 51 e.v. korte metten met deze bepalingen.

Toch is het arrest niet ondubbelzinnig. De kamer van het Hof was verdeeld (zes tegen drie), terwijl de president (in zijn — hier niet weergegeven — concurring opinion) bekent, zich met tegenzin bij de meerderheid te hebben aangesloten. Bij hem bestonden evenals bij Martens (in zijn wél weergegeven partly dissenting opinion) aarzelingen of in dit geval Van de Hurk wel als ‘slachtoffer’ in de zin van art. 25 kon worden aangemerkt.

Deze vraag competeert primair de Commissie. Misschien neemt daarom de meerderheid van de rechters — impliciet — aan dat Van de Hurk wel als ‘slachtoffer’ kon worden aangemerkt. Weliswaar had de Kroon niet ingegrepen in de beslissing van het CBvB, doch de enkele mogelijkheid daartoe kan reeds de schijn wekken dat de rechter niet vrij staat van de administratie en geneigd zal zijn de schaal ten gunste van de laatste te laten doorslaan. Een dergelijke rechterlijke afhankelijkheid laat zich vergelijken met het verwante begrip ‘partijdigheid’ in art. 6. Voor dat begrip hanteert het Europese Hof naast een subjectieve test waarbij gelet wordt op de persoonlijke overtuiging van de rechter, ook een objectieve test waarvoor een onregelmatigheid in de rechterlijke organisatie op zichzelf al voldoende kan zijn (EHRM 22 juni 1989, Langborger/Zweden A 155 § 32 e.v.).

Intussen was m.i. van een zwaarwegende schending van een mensenrecht in de onderhavige zaak bepaald geen sprake. De Kroon had immers nooit haar bevoegdheid tot ingrijpen benut. Het gebrek aan rechterlijke onafhankelijkheid is daarom in vergelijking met het arrest Benthem (EHRM 23 okt. 1985, NJ 1986, 102) wel zeer hypothetisch. In dat geval ging het om een instantie, de Afdeling Geschillen van bestuur van de Raad van State met enkel adviserende bevoegdheid, terwijl de Kroon metterdaad zo nu en dan van haar bevoegdheid gebruik maakte om contrair te gaan. In het arrest Benthem omschrijft het Hof de schending trouwens niet als het ontbreken van een ‘tribunal’ — wat daar voor de hand had gelegen — maar in ruimere termen als een schending van art. 6 lid 1.

Het dictum in de onderhavige zaak luidt daarentegen: ‘that the applicant’s civil rights and obligations were not ‘determined’ by a ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of that provision (nl. art. 6 lid 1)’. De nadruk ligt kennelijk op het element ‘gerecht’ in art. 6 lid 1. Dat is ruimer dan hetgeen de Commissie en de klager als rechtsvraag hadden geformuleerd; die vraag was beperkt tot het veronderstelde gebrek aan onafhankelijkheid van het CBvB.

De nadere precisering in het dictum tot vaststelling van burgerlijke rechten is niet geheel zonder betekenis. Was voor de ruimere formule, schending van art. 6 lid 1, gekozen dan had het arrest tevens grondslag kunnen zijn voor acties tegen de administratie die ingrijpt — ten nadele van de burger — in strafzaken. Dat zou bevestigd hebben dat de rechter in k.g. bevoegd behoort te zijn om bijvoorbeeld de rechtmatigheid te beoordelen van gevangenisstraf die wordt ondergaan in een andere dan door de strafrechter aangewezen inrichting van detentie of van langdurig uitstel van de plaatsing in een psychiatrische instelling na veroordeling tot terbeschikkingstelling (verg. Pres. Rb ‘s‑Gravenhage 21 april 1995, KG 210).

Op twee plaatsen geeft het arrest een reden voor dit deel van het dictum: in § 45 en § 54. Blijkens de rechtsoverweging in § 45 is het inherent aan het begrip ‘gerecht’ dat het bevoegd is een bindende beslissing te geven welke niet ten koste van de individuele partij door een niet-rechterlijke instantie ongedaan gemaakt kan worden.

Daaraan voegt het Hof toe, dat deze bevoegdheid is te beschouwen als element van de rechterlijke onafhankelijkheid, welke art. 6 lid 1 verlangt; een toespeling op de rechtsvraag zoals geformuleerd door Commissie en klager.

Na deze algemene en abstracte rechtsoverweging weerlegt het Hof in § 54 in concreto het voornaamste verweer van de Staat. Dit hield in, dat het CBvB, bij een eventuele ingreep van de Kroon, alsnog een beslissing krachtens art. 75 Wet ARBO had kunnen nemen. Het verweer wordt door het Hof van de hand gewezen, omdat het College niet van de beslissing van de Kroon mocht afwijken en — bovendien — omdat schadevergoeding niet op één lijn kan worden gesteld met een rechterlijke uitspraak waarbij aan het bestuur een specifiek bevel ten gunste van betrokkene wordt gegeven.

Vooral dit deel van het arrest is verwarrend. Het betreft niet zozeer de onafhankelijkheid van de rechter als wel de vraag naar de omvang van diens rechtsmacht en suggereert dat die rechtsmacht meer dient te omvatten dan louter vaststelling van een schadevergoeding. Als dit de strekking zou zijn dan worden allerlei nationale procedures op losse schroeven gezet. Men denke aan bijzondere vormen van onteigening (Onteigeningswet art. 72a e.v.), waarbij de rechtmatigheid van de beslissing niet of nauwelijks ter beoordeling van de rechter staat. Martens noemt nog het voorbeeld van art. 6:168 lid 1 BW: het geval dat de rechter een vordering strekkende tot een verbod, wegens zwaarwegende maatschappelijke belangen afwijst; alsdan is er eveneens recht op schadevergoeding.

Ook is mogelijk dat de rechter door het bestuur voor een fait accompli wordt gesteld, bijvoorbeeld wanneer hij de onrechtmatigheid van een ontslag constateert doch de vacature inmiddels weer is vervuld. In het algemeen doen zich vrij vaak situaties voor, waarin de rechter feitelijk slechts schadeloosstelling kan toekennen. Het is niet goed voorstelbaar dat in al dergelijke gevallen de rechterlijke controle niet aan art. 6 zou voldoen.

Pikant is in dit verband, dat het Europese Hof als internationaal rechter zélf niet meer dan een schadeloosstelling kan toekennen als het nationale recht slechts een gedeeltelijke restitutio in integrum mogelijk maakt (art. 50 EVRM) Het Europese Hof kan de nationale autoriteiten geen bevelen geven en mist mitsdien de volle rechtsmacht die art. 6 zou verlangen.

Het zal duidelijk zijn dat § 45 een beperkter strekking heeft. Daar wordt een niet-rechterlijke ingreep in een rechterlijke uitspraak verondersteld. Dat druist in tegen de idee van de rechtsstaat, zoals Martens het formuleert.

De gewraakte rechtsfiguur komt overigens nog steeds voor in het Nederlandse recht. Een zeldzaam maar belangrijk voorbeeld is art. 13 lid 4 Deurwaardersreglement, dat de deurwaarder verplicht, het doen van exploot te weigeren indien de Minister van Justitie hem laat weten dat het doen van dat exploot strijdig zou zijn met de volkenrechtelijke verplichtingen van de staat (zie Vz AR RvS 24 nov. 1986, KG 1987, 38). Het is een voor de internationale betrekkingen onmisbare bepaling.

Gezien de discrepantie tussen beide rechtsoverwegingen en de daarmee verbonden consequenties voor het nationale recht, lijkt het aan te bevelen § 45 als hét dragend argument van dit arrest te beschouwen. Dat stelt de onaantastbaarheid van het rechterlijk oordeel centraal. De daar geformuleerde regel is een gewichtig uitvloeisel van de rechtsstaat. Men mag hopen dat het EHRM niettemin in voorkomende gevallen een bepaling als art. 13 lid 4 Deurwaardersreglement zal willen sauveren als een uitzondering die deze regel bevestigt.

Dit arrest is ook gepubliceerd in NJCM-bulletin 1994, p. 389–405 m.nt. L.F.M. Verhey.