NJ 1997 , 699

EUROPEES HOF VOOR DE RECHTEN VAN DE MENS

17 december 1996

(Bernhardt, Vilhjálmsson, Golcüklü, Pettiti, Walsh, Spielmann, De Meyer, Valticos, Martens, Palm, Pekkanen, Loizou, Morenilla, Freeland, Wildhaber, Mifsud Bonnici, Makarczyk, Gotchev, Repik, Kuris; m.nt. Kn)

ECHR Reports 1996-VI, p. 2044
m.nt. Kn
ECHR Reports 1996–Ⅵ, 2044

Regeling

EVRM art. 6

Essentie

Bescherming tegen gedwongen self-incrimination gaat niet verder dan het zwijgrecht. Ander bewijsmateriaal mag onder dwang van verdachte worden genomen.

Bescherming tegen gedwongen self-incrimination gaat niet verder dan zwijgrecht / ander bewijsmateriaal mag onder dwang verdachte worden genomen

Samenvatting

Het zwijgrecht en het recht om geen bewijs tegen zichzelf te hoeven leveren vormen essentialia van een fair proces en dus van art. 6 EVRM. Het gaat daarbij onder meer om de bescherming van de verdachte tegen ongeoorloofde dwangtoepassing door de autoriteiten, om zo rechterlijke dwalingen te vermijden en de doelstellingen van art. 6 te bereiken. In het bijzonder het recht om geen bewijs tegen zichzelf te hoeven leveren veronderstelt dat de vervolging niet gebaseerd wordt op bewijsmateriaal, dat tegen de wil van de verdachte is verkregen door dwang of drukuitoefening. Dit recht legt zo de verbinding met de onschuldpresumptie van art. 6 lid 2 (§ 68). Het heeft echter vooral betrekking op het respecteren van de wil van de verdachte om te zwijgen. Het strekt zich niet uit tot materiaal, dat onder dwang van de verdachte wordt verkregen, maar onafhankelijk van de wil van de verdachte bestaat, zoals geschriften, ademlucht, bloed- en urinemonsters en lichaamsmateriaal voor een DNA-test (§ 69). In casu waren verklaringen van de latere verdachte, onder een spreekplicht afgelegd in het kader van een onafhankelijk onderzoek, tijdens de strafzaak tegen hem gebruikt. Schending van het verbod van gedwongen self-incrimination.* [1]

Partijen

Saunders,

tegen

Verenigd Koninkrijk.

Tekst

De feiten

Twee Engelse drank‑ en voedingsmiddelenconcerns, Guinness en Argyll, zijn in het begin van 1986 verwikkeld in een gevecht om de overname van een derde bedrijf, Distillers. Beiden doen aan de aandeelhouders van Distillers het aanbod om aandelen om te ruilen, dat wil zeggen: aandelen Distillers kunnen worden ingeruild voor aandelen van het biedende bedrijf volgens een bepaalde ruilverhouding. Daardoor is voor deze aandeelhouders de beursnotering van beide bieders een doorslaggevende factor in hun keuze. Gedurende de periode dat het bod uitstaat stijgt de koers van aandelen Guinness dramatisch, om na afloop daarvan weer flink te dalen. Guinness blijkt de meeste aandelen Distillers te hebben bemachtigd en wint dus de strijd.

Al vrij snel doen geruchten de ronde, dat de handelwijze van Guinness geen zuivere koffie is. De koersstijging van Guinness-aandelen, en daarmee natuurlijk de aantrekkingskracht van diens ruil-aanbod, is het resultaat geweest van een onrechtmatige beïnvloeding van de beurs. Bij deze operatie zou Guinness betrokken zijn. Aan personen, die door hun aankopen van aandelen Guinness de beursnotering ondersteunden of opdreven, waren aantrekkelijke bedragen geboden als schadeloosstelling voor eventuele verliezen en als beloning in geval van succes. Dergelijke methoden zijn om twee redenen onrechtmatig: a. ze zijn in strijd met de Londense City Gedragscode voor Overnames en Fusies geheim gehouden; b. de Companies Act 1985 verbiedt bedrijven om met financiële ondersteuning de aankoop van eigen aandelen te stimuleren.

Naast de betalingen aan de personen, die daadwerkelijk de Guinness-koers hadden geholpen, waren ook grote bedragen uitbetaald aan hen, die voor de werving van deze personen hadden gezorgd. Het geld hiervoor kwam allemaal uit de portemonnee van Guinness, die de ware aard van de betalingen verhulde door gebruik te maken van valse facturen.

Naar aanleiding van het mogelijke wangedrag maakt de minister van handel en industrie gebruik van zijn bevoegdheid uit de Companies Act 1985 en benoemt onafhankelijke inspecteurs (DTI-Inspectors). Zij worden belast met het instellen van een onderzoek naar de gebeurtenissen rondom de overname van Distillers. Op 10 dec. 1986 begint een serie hoorgesprekken met diverse betrokkenen, die wettelijk onder de verplichting staan aan het onderzoek medewerking te verlenen. De appellant is een van hen, aangezien hij ten tijde van de overname hoofddirecteur van Guinness is. Met hem worden in de loop van het onderzoek in totaal negen gesprekken gevoerd, in het bijzijn van zijn raadslieden, de eerste op 10 jan. en de laatste op 12 juni 1987.

Op 12 jan. 1987 krijgt de minister van handel en industrie bericht van de DTI-Inspectors dat er concrete aanwijzingen zijn van strafbare feiten. Dit bericht gaat ook naar een medewerker van de Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), waarna wordt beslist, dat het onderzoek moet doorgaan. De resultaten ervan zullen aan de Crown Prosecution Service worden doorgegeven, waarvan de DPP het hoofd is. In de loop van januari en februari 1987 vinden diverse besprekingen plaats van overheidsfunctionarissen over de vraag of en wanneer een strafrechtelijke procedure gestart moet worden. De DTI-Inspectors zeggen hun medewerking aan verder strafrechtelijk onderzoek toe. Tevens wordt schriftelijk materiaal van het door hen gevoerde onderzoek beschikbaar gesteld aan een met de strafrechtelijke kant van de hele zaak belast team.

Op verzoek van de DPP start de politie in mei 1987 een officieel strafrechtelijk onderzoek. In het vervolg daarvan wordt Saunders met ettelijke medeverdachten in staat van beschuldiging gesteld terzake van een lange lijst van feiten. De eerste zitting van de Crown Court vindt plaats op 27 april 1989, waarna in september 1989 de recht-voorzitter de hele zaak vanwege de omvang splitst in twee procedures. Na een daartoe strekkend verzoek van een medeverdachte, Parnes, en van Saunders zelf vinden in november 1989 en januari 1990 voir dire procedures plaats over de toelaatbaarheid van de processen-verbaal van de gesprekken met de DTI-Inspectors. Met voir dire wordt bedoeld een ingelast mini-proces (wat heet mini, het kan meerdere procesdagen in beslag nemen), waar de rechter zonder de jury een onderzoek instelt en een beslissing neemt over een opgeworpen rechtsvraag, zoals over de toelaatbaarheid van bepaalde bewijsmiddelen.

De verdediging baseerde zich op art. 76 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), stellende dat de verklaringen onder druk waren afgelegd, en op art. 78 PACE, stellende dat het gebruik van de verklaringen afbreuk zou doen aan de fairness van het proces. De rechter oordeelde echter dat het bewijs toelaatbaar was, zij het met een uitzondering. In het algemeen waren de omstandigheden zodanig, dat de verklaringen toelaatbaar waren als bewijsmiddel in de zin van de PACE. De verplichting tot medewerking uit de Companies Act staat daaraan niet in de weg, evenmin het risico, dat de betrokkene bewijs tegen zichzelf levert. Een waarschuwing van die strekking hadden de DTI-inspectors niet hoeven geven, zo oordeelde de rechter. Een uitzondering maakt hij voor de laatste twee gesprekken met Saunders, die plaatsvonden nadat hij reeds in staat van beschuldiging was gesteld. Een verplichte ondervraging na dat moment, het formele begin van de strafzaak, maakt het bewijs ontoelaatbaar op de voet van art. 78 PACE.

Na deze behandeling van de bezwaren werd de hoofdzaak hervat. Saunders stond terecht met drie medeverdachten. Hij moest zich verdedigen tegen een beschuldiging van in totaal vijftien delicten, omvattende het opmaken van een valse boekhouding, diefstal en samenzwering. Tijdens het proces (vijfenzeventig dagen voor de verhoren, tien voor de betogen van de raadslieden van beide zijden en vijf voor summing up, de samenvatting van het geheel door de rechter ten behoeve van de jury) legde Saunders als enige een verklaring af van zijn totale onschuld en onwetendheid. Deze verklaring, afgelegd nadat delen van de verhoorverslagen van de DTI-Inspectors aan de jury waren voorgehouden, werd door de prosecution bestreden, onder meer op basis van het materiaal van de DTI-Inspectors. Verder speelde de financieel directeur van Guinness een sleutelrol in het proces. Zijn getuigenverklaring, gegeven nadat aan hem immuniteit was gegarandeerd, speelde een cardinale rol. Het DTI-materiaal werd onder meer geciteerd om aan te tonen, dat in tegenstelling tot zijn verklaring tijdens de strafzaak Saunders hij wel degelijk op de hoogte was van een betaling van 5 miljoen pond aan een Mr. W. als beloning voor verleende diensten in de periode dat het overnamebod uitstond. Ook in de verdediging van een medeverdachte en in de summing up van de rechter kwam de tegenstrijdigheid in Saunders’ verklaringen naar voren. Saunders werd uiteindelijk op twaalf punten schuldig bevonden en tot vijf jaar gevangenisstraf veroordeeld.

Bij verschillende volgende gelegenheden werd de handelwijze in de aanloop naar de strafzaak namens Saunders of een medeverdachte ter beoordeling aan de rechter in eerste aanleg of aan de Court of Appeal voorgelegd, maar tevergeefs. Onder meer werd de stelling verworpen, dat het uitstellen van de formele beschuldiging misbruik van recht zou zijn geweest. Men zou daardoor bewust hebben aangestuurd op het verkrijgen van bekennende verklaringen met behulp van de bijzondere bevoegdheden van de DTI-Inspectors. In de verschillende appelzaken werd consequent vastgehouden aan de toelaatbaarheid van de verklaringen in het DTI-onderzoek, onder meer met de verwijzing naar de wil van de wetgever, die nu eenmaal heeft gekozen voor een verstrekkend onderzoeksregime bij dit soort zaken. Van belang voor de concrete strafzaak was de onafhankelijkheid, waarmee de DTI-Inspectors konden werken, en de zorgvuldigheid en fairness van de hoorgesprekken, geheel volgens de norm van de geldende rechtspraak in Pergamon (zie onder toepasselijk recht).

Het toepasselijke Engelse recht

De bevoegdheid van de minister van handel en industrie om de inspecteurs te benoemen is gebaseerd op art. 432 en 442 Companies Act 1985. Deze bepalingen bevatten de ruim omschreven gevallen waarin de minister tot benoeming mag overgaan.

De inspecteurs hebben een zuivere onderzoekstaak. Dat is vastgesteld in de zaak Pergamon Press Ltd (1971) Chancery Reports 388, per Sachs LJ op p. 401:

In wezen is de taak van de Inspectors om een onderzoek in te stellen gericht op de ontdekking van feiten, met als resultaat dat anderen actie ondernemen; het behoort niet tot hun taak over verdere actie zelf een beslissing te nemen en a fortiori is het niet aan hen om, als een actie plaats vindt, een beslissende stem te hebben in de punten die zich kunnen voordoen.

Art. 434 Companies Act 1985 luidt (voorzover van belang):

Wanneer inspecteurs zijn benoemd op grond van art. 431 of 432 zijn alle functionarissen in de onderneming (officers and agents) verplicht

alle boeken en bescheiden van of met betrekking tot de onderneming over te leggen, welke in hun bezit of macht zijn,

voor de inspecteurs te verschijnen als ze daartoe worden opgeroepen en,

anderszins alle medewerking te verlenen, aan de inspecteurs met betrekking tot hun onderzoek, voorzover zij daartoe redelijkerwijs in staat zijn ……

Een inspecteur is bevoegd de functionarissen van de onderneming (…) onder ede te ondervragen met betrekking tot de zaken van de onderneming en hen dienovereenkomstig te beëdigen …

…

Elk antwoord op een vraag, gesteld aan een persoon in het kader van de uitoefening van de hier bedoelde bevoegdheden (…), kan als bewijs tegen hem gebruikt worden.

Art. 436 Companies Act voorziet in een strafbepaling, die zich krachtens lid 1 richt onder meer tot de functionarissen ( officers and agents) van de onderneming. Lid 2 luidt:

In het geval dat deze personen

in strijd met de verplichting van art. 434 weigeren de boeken of bescheiden over te leggen,

geen gehoor geven aan de oproep om voor de inspecteurs te verschijnen, of

enige vraag weigeren te beantwoorden, die met betrekking tot de zaken van de onderneming (…) aan hen gesteld is,

zijn de inspecteurs bevoegd dit schriftelijk te rapporteren aan het gerecht.

Volgens lid 3 van dit artikel is het gerecht vervolgens bevoegd een onderzoek in te stellen naar de zaak. Na het horen van eventuele getuigen en de eventuele betogen ter verdediging is het gerecht bevoegd de weigerachtige persoon te bestraffen alsof hij zich aan contempt of court heeft schuldig gemaakt. Dat betekent een geldboete of een gevangenisstraf van maximaal twee jaren.

De aangehaalde artikelen van de PACE luiden voorzover van belang:

Art. 76 PACE:

Een bekentenis van de verdachte mag als bewijs worden gebezigd in elke procedure, voorzover relevant voor de te beslissen kwesties, en voorzover die niet is uitgesloten volgens dit artikel.

Indien in een procedure, waarin de vervolging een bekentenis als bewijs wil opvoeren, de stelling wordt voorgelegd dat deze bekentenis verkregen is

door de verdachte onder druk te zetten; of

als gevolg van enig optreden dat de daardoor afgelegde bekentenis onder de gegeven omstandigheden onbetrouwbaar maakt,

is de rechter verplicht de bekentenis niet als bewijs toe te laten. Een uitzondering hierop mag worden gemaakt als de vervolging slaagt in het bewijs, dat de bekentenis (ongeacht het waarheidsgehalte ervan) niet op een dergelijke wijze is verkregen.

Art. 78 PACE:

In elke procedure is de rechter bevoegd bewijsmiddelen waarop de vervolging zich wenst te baseren, te weigeren indien toelating van het bewijsmiddel een zodanig negatief effect heeft op de fairness van de procedure, dat het niet behoort te worden toegelaten. Daarbij worden alle omstandigheden in aanmerking genomen, ook die waaronder het bewijsmateriaal is verkregen.

Onder bekentenis in de zin van de PACE wordt volgens art. 82 lid 1 verstaan elke verklaring die geheel of gedeeltelijk belastend is voor degene die haar aflegde, onverschillig of dat gebeurde tegenover een persoon in functie of niet, en onverschillig of de verklaring in woorden of op andere wijze is afgelegd.

Van belang is nog dat de Criminal Justice Act 1987 ook een meewerkverplichting kent ten opzichte van het hoofd van de Serious Fraud Office. Art. 2 stelt onder strafbedreiging verplicht, dat de persoon van wie de zaken worden onderzocht, alle vragen beantwoordt, ook als dat hemzelf zou bezwaren. Dit levert, enige uitzonderingen daargelaten, echter geen toelaatbaar bewijs op tegen de betrokkene.

Op 20 juli 1988 legt appellant zijn zaak voor aan de Commissie. Op 7 dec. 1993 verklaart de Commissie de klacht ontvankelijk. In haar rapport van 10 mei 1994 komt zij met veertien stemmen tegen een tot een schending van art. 6 lid 1 Europees Verdrag tot bescherming van de rechten van de mens en de fundamentele vrijheden (EVRM).

As to the law

I Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention

The applicant contended that he was denied a fair trial in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, states:

In the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by an independent and impartial tribunal …

The Commission found that there had been such a violation, although this was contested by the Government.

The right not to incriminate oneself

The arguments of those appearing before the Court

The applicant

The applicant complained of the fact that statements made by him under compulsion to the Inspectors appointed by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) during their investigation were admitted as evidence against him at his subsequent criminal trial.

He maintained that implicit in the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 § 1, as the Court had recognised in its judgments in Funke v. France (25 February 1993, Series A no. 256–A, p. 22 (NJ 1993, 485; red.), § 44) and John Murray v. the United Kingdom (8 February 1996, Reports-1996–I, p. 30 (NJ 1996, 725; red.), § 45), was the right of an individual not to be compelled to contribute incriminating evidence to be used in a prosecution against him. This principle was closely linked to the presumption of innocence which was expressly guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Convention and had been recognised by the European Court of Justice (ORKEM v. Commission, Case 374/87 (1989) European court Reports 3283) and by the constitutional Court of South Africa (Ferreira v. Levin and Others, judgment of 6 December 1995) amongst others. It should apply equally to all defendants regardless of the nature of the allegations against them or their level of education and intelligence. It followed that the use made by the prosecution of the transcripts of interviews with the Inspectors in subsequent criminal proceedings was contrary to Article 6.

Furthermore, the applicant argued that this use of the transcripts was particularly unfair in his case since, in the words of the Court of Appeal, they ‘formed a significant pat of the prosecution case’. Three days were spent reading extracts from his interviews with the Inspectors to the jury before Mr Saunders decided that he ought to give evidence to explain and expand upon this material. As a result, he was subjected to intensive cross-examination concerning alleged inconsistencies between his oral testimony at trial and his responses to the Inspectors’ questions, to which the trial judge drew attention in his summing up to the jury. The prosecution’s task was thus facilitated when it was able to contrast its own evidence with Mr Saunders’ more specific denials in his interviews.

The Government

The Government submitted that only statements which are self-incriminating can fall within the privilege against self-incrimination. However, exculpatory answers or answers which, if true, are consistent with or would serve to confirm the defence of an accused cannot be properly characterised as self-incriminating. In their submission, neither the applicant nor the Commission had identified at any stage a single answer given by the applicant to the DTI Inspectors which was self-incriminating. There cannot be derived from the privilege against self-incrimination a further right not to be confronted with evidence that requires the accused, in order successfully to rebut it, to give evidence himself. That, in effect, is what the applicant is claiming when he alleges that the admission of the transcript ‘compelled’ him to give evidence.

The Government accepted that a defendant in a criminal trial cannot be compelled by the prosecution or by the court to appear as a witness at his own trial or to answer questions put to him in the dock, and that an infringement of this principle would be likely to result in a defendant not having a fair hearing. However, the privilege against self-incrimination was not absolute or immutable. Other jurisdictions (Norway, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America) permit the compulsory taking of statements during investigation into corporate and financial frauds and their subsequent use in a criminal trial in order to confront the accused’s and witnesses’ oral testimony. Nor does it follow from an acceptance of the privilege that the prosecution is never to be permitted to use in evidence self-incriminating statements, documents or other evidence obtained as a result of the exercise of compulsory powers. Examples of such permitted use include the prosecution’s right to obtain documents pursuant to search warrants or samples of breath, blood or urine.

In the Government’s submission it would be wrong to draw from the Court’s Funke judgment (referred to in paragraph 60 above) a broad statement of principle concerning the ‘right to silence’, since the nature of that right was not defined in the judgment. There can be no absolute rule implicit in Article 6 that any use of statements obtained under compulsion automatically rendered criminal proceedings unfair. In this respect it was necessary to have regard to all the facts of the case including the many procedural safeguards inherent in the system. For example, at the stage of the Inspectors’ inquiry, injustice was prevented by the facts that the Inspectors were independent and subject to judicial supervision and that the person questioned was entitled to be legally represented before them and provided with a transcript of his responses which he could correct or expand. Moreover, during the course of any subsequent criminal trial, a defendant who had provided answers to the Inspectors under compulsion was protected by the judge’s powers to exclude such evidence; admissions which might be unreliable or might have been obtained by oppressive means had to be excluded and there was a discretion to exclude other evidence if its admission would have an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings.

The Government further emphasised that, whilst the interests of the individual should not be overlooked, there was also a public interest in the honest conduct of companies and in the effective prosecution of those involved in complex corporate fraud. This latter interest required both that those under suspicion should be compelled to respond to the questions of Inspectors and that the prosecuting authorities should be able to rely in any subsequent criminal trial on the responses elicited. In this respect a distinction could properly be drawn between corporate fraud and other types of crime, since devices such as complex corporate structures, nominee companies, complicated financial transactions and false accounting records could be used to conceal fraudulent misappropriation of corporate funds or personal responsibility for such misconduct. Frequently the documentary evidence relating to such transactions would be insufficient for a prosecution or incomprehensible without the explanations of the individuals concerned. Furthermore, it had to be remembered that the kind of person questioned by the Inspectors was likely to be a sophisticated businessman with access to expert legal advice, who had moreover chosen to take advantage of the benefits afforded by limited liability and separate corporate personality.

The Commission

The Commission considered that the privilege against self-incrimination formed an important element in safeguarding individuals from oppression and coercion, was linked to the principle of the presumption of innocence and should apply equally to all types of accused, including those alleged to have committed complex corporate frauds. In the instant case, the incriminating material, which the applicant was compelled to provide, furnished a not insignificant part of the evidence against him at trial, since it contained admissions which must have exerted additional pressure on him to take the witness stand. The use of this evidence was therefore oppressive and substantially impaired Mr Saunders’ ability to defend himself against the criminal charges he faced, thereby depriving him of a fair trial.

At the hearing before the Court, the Delegate stressed that even steadfast denials of guilt in answer to incriminating questions can be highly incriminating and very damaging to a defendant. This was so in the present case as the answers were used against him both in the opening and closing speeches and in cross-examination to establish that the answers given to the Inspectors could not be believed and that the applicant was dishonest.

Amicus curiae

Liberty, with reference to various international human rights treaties and the law existing in a number of Contracting Parties, requested the Court to find that Article 6 prevents self-incriminating evidence from being obtained from an individual under threat of judicial sanction and from being admissible in criminal proceedings.

The Court’s assessment

The Court first observes that the applicant’s complaint is confined to the use of the statements obtained by the DTI Inspectors during the criminal proceedings against him. While an administrative investigation is capable of involving the determination of a ‘criminal charge’ in the light of the Court’s case-law concerning the autonomous meaning of this concept, it has not been suggested in the pleadings before the Court that Article 6 § 1 was applicable to the proceedings conducted by the Inspectors or that these proceedings themselves involved the determination of a criminal charge within the meaning of that provision (see, inter alia, the Deweer v. Belgium judgment of 27 February 1980, Series A no. 35, pp. 21–24 ( NJ 1980, 561; red.), § § 42–47). In this respect the Court recalls its judgment in Fayed v. the United Kingdom where it held that the functions performed by the Inspectors under section 432 (2) of the Companies Act 1985 were essentially investigative in nature and that they did not adjudicate either in form or in substance. Their purpose was to ascertain and record facts which might subsequently be used as the basis for action by other competent authorities — prosecuting, regulatory, disciplinary or even legislative (judgment of 21 September 1994, Series A no. 294–B, p. 47 ( NJ 1995, 463; red.), § 61). As stated in that case, a requirement that such a preparatory investigation should be subject to the guarantees of a judicial procedure as set forth in Article 6 § 1 would in practice unduly hamper the effective regulation in the public interest of complex financial and commercial activities (ibid., p. 48, § 62).

Accordingly the Court’s sole concern in the present case is with the use made of the relevant statements at the applicant’s criminal trial.

The Court recalls that, although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention, the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself, are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6. Their rationale lies, inter alia, in the protection of the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6 (see the above-mentioned John Murray judgment and the above-mentioned Funke judgment. The right not to incriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused. In this sense the right is closely linked to the presumption of innocence contained in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.

The right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned, however, with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent. As commonly understood in the legal systems of the Contracting Parties to the Convention and elsewhere, it does not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of material which may be obtained from the accused through the use of compulsory powers but which has an existence independent of the will of the suspect such as, inter alia, documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and urine samples and bodily tissue for the purpose of DNA testing.

In the present case the Court is only called upon to decide whether the use made by the prosecution of the statements obtained from the applicant by the Inspectors amounted to an unjustifiable infringement of the right. This question must be examined by the Court in the light of all the circumstances of the case. In particular, it must be determined whether the applicant has been subject to compulsion to give evidence and whether the use made of the resulting testimony at his trial offended the basic principles of a fair procedure inherent in Article 6 § 1 of which the right not to incriminate oneself is a constituent element.

It has not been disputed by the Government that the applicant was subject to legal compulsion to give evidence to the Inspectors. He was obliged under sections 434 and 436 of the Companies Act 1985 to answer the questions put to him by the Inspectors in the course of nine lengthy interviews of which seven were admissible as evidence at his trial. A refusal by the applicant to answer the questions put to him could have led to a finding of contempt of court and the imposition of a fine or committal to prison for up to two years and it was no defence to such refusal that the questions were of an incriminating nature.

However, the Government have emphasised, before the Court, that nothing said by the applicant in the course of the interviews was self-incriminating and that he had merely given exculpatory answers or answers which, if true, would serve to confirm his defence. In their submission only statements which are self-incriminating could fall within the privilege against self-incrimination.

The Court does not accept the Government’s premise on this point since some of the applicant’s answers were in fact of an incriminating nature in the sense that they contained admissions to knowledge of information which tended to incriminate him. In any event, bearing in mind the concept of fairness in Article 6, the right not to incriminate oneself cannot reasonably be confined to statements of admission of wrongdoing or to remarks which are directly incriminating. Testimony obtained under compulsion which appears on its face to be of a non-incriminating nature — such as exculpatory remarks or mere information on questions of fact — may later be deployed in criminal proceedings in support of the prosecution case, for example to contradict or cast doubt upon other statements of the accused or evidence given by him during the trial or to otherwise undermine his credibility. Where the credibility of an accused must be assessed by a jury the use of such testimony may be especially harmful. It follows that what is of the essence in this context is the use to which evidence obtained under compulsion is made in the course of the criminal trial.

In this regard, the Court observes that part of the transcript of answers given by the applicant was read to the jury by counsel for the prosecution over a three-day period despite objections by the applicant. The fact that such extensive use was made of the interviews strongly suggests that the prosecution must have believed that the reading of the transcripts assisted their case in establishing the applicant’s dishonesty. This interpretation of the intended impact of the material is supported by the remarks made by the trial judge in the course of the voir dire concerning the eighth and ninth interviews to the effect that each of the applicant’s statements was capable of being a ‘confession’ for the purposes of section 82 (1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Similarly, the Court of Appeal considered that the interviews formed ‘a significant part’ of the prosecution’s case against the applicant. Moreover, there were clearly instances where the statements were used by the prosecution to incriminating effect in order to establish the applicant’s knowledge of payments to persons involved in the share support operation and to call into question his honesty. They were also used by counsel for the applicant’s co-accused to cast doubt on the applicant’s version of events.

In sum, the evidence available to the Court supports the claim that the transcripts of the applicant’s answers, whether directly self-incriminating or not, were used in the course of the proceedings in a manner which sought to incriminate the applicant.

Both the applicant and the Commission maintained that the admissions contained in the interviews must have exerted additional pressure on the applicant to give testimony during the trial rather than to exercise his right to remain silent. However, it was the Government’s view that the applicant chose to give evidence because of the damaging effect of the testimony of the chief witness for the prosecution, Mr Roux.

Although it cannot be excluded that one of the reasons which affected this decision was the extensive use made by the prosecution of the interviews, the Court finds it unnecessary to speculate on the reasons why the applicant chose to give evidence at his trial.

Nor does the Court find it necessary, having regard to the above assessment as to the use of the interviews during the trial, to decide whether the right not to incriminate oneself is absolute or whether infringements of it may be justified in particular circumstances.

It does not accept the Government’s argument that the complexity of corporate fraud and the vital public interest in the investigation of such fraud and the punishment of those responsible could justify such a marked departure as that which occurred in the present case from one of the basic principles of a fair procedure. Like the Commission, it considers that the general requirements of fairness contained in Article 6, including the right not to incriminate oneself, apply to criminal proceedings in respect of all types of criminal offences without distinction from the most simple to the most complex. The public interest cannot be invoked to justify the use of answers compulsorily obtained in a non-judicial investigation to incriminate the accused during the trial proceedings. It is noteworthy in this respect that under the relevant legislation statements obtained under compulsory powers by the Serious Fraud Office cannot, as a general rule, be adduced in evidence at the subsequent trial of the person concerned. Moreover the fact that statements were made by the applicant prior to his being charged does not prevent their later use in criminal proceedings from constituting an infringement of the right.

It follows from the above analysis and from the fact that section 434 (5) of the Companies Act 1985 authorises, as noted by both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal, the subsequent use in criminal proceedings of statements obtained by the Inspectors that the various procedural safeguards to which reference has been made by the respondent Government (see paragraph 63 above) cannot provide a defence in the present case since they did not operate to prevent the use of the statements in the subsequent criminal proceedings.

Accordingly, there has been an infringement in the present case of the right not to incriminate oneself.

Alleged misuse of powers by the prosecuting authorities

The applicant also complained that the prosecuting authorities had deliberately delayed the institution of the police investigation to enable the Inspectors to gather evidence under their special powers. He referred to the meeting on 30 January 1987 between the Inspectors and representatives of the Crown Prosecution Service, which preceded the formal initiation of the police investigation by some three months. In addition, documents disclosed for the purposes of the most recent appeal showed that, in the words of the Court of Appeal, ‘all concerned were conscious that the inspectors had greater powers than the police when conducting their interviews and it was clearly hoped that the inspectors would elicit answers … which could be used in evidence at trial’.

He reasoned that the fact that the Court of Appeal had found that there had been no abuse of process should not be decisive, since the domestic court could not apply the Convention and had been bound by English law to conclude that the use made at trial of the transcripts of the interviews with the Inspectors had not been unfair.

The Government emphasised that the applicant had already argued this issue before the Court of Appeal without success and that in raising it again in Strasbourg he was attempting to use the Court as a fourth instance, contrary to the established jurisprudence of the Court.

The Commission found it unnecessary to consider this head of complaint in view of its finding that the applicant had been denied a fair trial by reason of the use made of the transcripts during his trial.

In the light of the above finding of an infringement of the right not to incriminate oneself, the Court considers it unnecessary to examine the applicant’s allegations on this point. It notes, however, the findings of the Court of Appeal that the Inspectors had conducted their inquiries independently without briefing or prompting by the prosecuting authorities and that there had been no improper or unfair collusion between them.

Conclusion

In conclusion the applicant was deprived of a fair hearing in violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

II Application of Article 50 of the Convention

The applicant sought just satisfaction under Article 50 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the … Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.

A. Damage

Pecuniary loss

The applicant submitted that the prosecution case against him would have been in serious difficulties but for the evidence introduced at his trial, in violation of Article 6. He thus claimed pecuniary loss amounting to £ 3,668,181.37. This claim was made up of sums in respect of loss of earnings up to May 1995, travelling and subsistence expenses, fees paid to solicitors (Payne Hicks Beach) relating to the interviews before the Inspectors and to solicitors (Landau and Landau) in respect of, inter alia, the criminal proceedings.

At the hearing before the Court, however, the applicant accepted that ‘true compensation’ would be a finding in his favour by the Court and the resulting vindication of his good name.

The Government submitted that the applicant’s claim for pecuniary loss was excessive. In particular, they pointed out that Mr Saunders had not criticised the investigation by the Inspectors itself, but had nonetheless sought reimbursement for his legal costs in connection with it. With regard to his claim for loss of earnings, they submitted that he was dismissed by Guinness following the company’s own investigation into the conduct of the takeover. Moreover, he had been in receipt of a pension from Guinness of £ 74,000 per annum since his dismissal, in addition to which, since May 1993, he had earned approximately £ 125,000 net per annum as a business consultant.

The Delegate of the Commission emphasised that in finding a breach of Article 6 § 1 the Commission could not be taken to have made any suggestion as to the likely outcome of Mr Saunders’ trial had the transcripts not been admitted in evidence.

The Court observes that the finding of a breach in the present case concerned the criminal proceedings against the applicant and not the proceedings before the Inspectors about which no complaint was made. Moreover, it cannot speculate as to the question whether the outcome of the trial would have been any different had use not been made of the transcripts by the prosecution (see, mutatis mutandis, the John Murray judgment cited above at paragraph 68, p. …, § 56) and, like the Commission, underlines that the finding of a breach of the Convention is not to be taken to carry any implication as regards that question.

It therefore considers that no causal connection has been established between the losses claimed by the applicant and the Court’s finding of a violation.

Non-pecuniary loss

The applicant sought non-pecuniary damages of £ 1 million to compensate him for the denial of his right to a fair trial and the resulting anxiety, anguish and imprisonment.

The Government submitted that no award should be made under this head.

The Court considers that, in the circumstances of the case, the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage sustained.

B. Costs and expenses

The applicant claimed a total of £ 336,460.75 by way of costs and expenses in connection with the Strasbourg proceedings. This was composed of (1) £ 82,284.50 in respect of counsel’s fees; (2) £ 42,241.25 in respect of solicitor’s fees and (3) £ 211,935 concerning the fees of the applicant’s advisors, Mr and Mrs Devlin.

The Government considered that the amounts claimed under this head were excessive. In particular they submitted that no award should be made in respect of the fees of Mr and Mrs Devlin since the applicant could have effectively presented his case in Strasbourg with the assistance only from experienced solicitors and leading and junior counsel.

The Delegate of the Commission had no comments to make on the amounts claimed.

The Court is not satisfied that the amounts claimed by the applicant were necessarily incurred or reasonable as to quantum. Deciding on an equitable basis, it awards £ 75,000 under this head.

c Default interest

According to the information available to the Court, the statutory rate of interest applicable in the United Kingdom at the date of adoption of the present judgment is 8% per annum.

For these reasons, the Court

Holds by sixteen votes to four that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

Holds unanimously that the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage sustained;

Holds unanimously

that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, £ 75,000 (seventy-five thousand pounds sterling) in respect of costs and expenses;

that simple interest at an annual rate of 8% shall be payable from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement;

Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.

Dissenting opinion of Judge Martens joined by Judge Kuris

I Introduction

A

I have found it impossible to convince myself that in this case the United Kingdom has violated Mr Saunders’ rights under Article 6 of the Convention. Nor has the Court’s judgment so persuaded me.

What is at stake is a knotty, but important question relating to a topic which is not only very controversial but also appears prone to arousing rather strong emotions.

Assume that the ‘right to silence’ and the ‘privilege against self-discrimination’ are not absolute (see § § 7–12 below) but — like other rights implied in Article 6 — allow for limitations; assume, further, that such limitations cannot be taken into account unless they are in accordance with the law, pursue a legitimate aim and are proportionate to that aim* [2] ; then the question becomes whether these requirements are fulfilled in the present case?

Unlike the majority, I have come to the conclusion that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. In order to elucidate that opinion I find it necessary to start with some general considerations with respect to both immunities in issue. B

In its judgment of 8 February 1996 in the case of John Murray v. the United Kingdom (Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996, … § 45, p. …) the Court has proclaimed that the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6 of the Convention comprises two immunities: the ‘right to remain silent’ and the ‘privilege against self-incrimination’.

The wording of this paragraph in Murray — especially if compared to that in paragraph 44 of the Funke v. France judgment of 25 February 1993 (Series A no. 256, p. 22, § 44) — clearly suggests that, in the Court’s opinion, two separate immunities are involved. From a conceptual point of view it would, however, seem obvious that the privilege against self-incrimination (= roughly speaking, the right not to be obliged to produce evidence against oneself) is the broader right, which encompasses the right to silence (= roughly speaking, the right not to answer questions).

The present judgment makes it less certain that the Court really makes a distinction. I will come back to that aspect of the present judgment hereinafter (see paragraph 12 below). Here it suffices to note that in my opinion two separate, but related, rights are involved, of which the privilege against self-incrimination, as I have just indicated, is the broader one.

In paragraph 45 of the Murray judgment the Court further noted that these rights are not specifically mentioned in Article 6. Of course it was, moreover, aware of the fact that the universal Declaration ignores both rights and that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights only contains ‘the right not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt’ (Article 14 paragraph 3 (g)). It nevertheless felt entitled to hold as indicated in paragraph 4 above on the ground that these two immunities ’are generally recognised international standards ’. Thus it furnished, albeit subsequently, both some motivation for and clarification of a similar finding in paragraph 44 of the above-mentioned Funke judgment, a finding which has been widely criticised as being unmotivated and unclear.

In paragraph 45 of the Murray judgment the Court even ventured to go into the difficult and highly controversial question of the rationale of these two immunities. It said that

y providing the accused with protection against improper compulsion by the authorities these immunities contribute to avoiding miscarriages of justice and to securing the aims of Article 6.

C

In the John Murray case I belonged to be majority. As the Court noted, what was at stake in that case was whether these two immunities were absolute. I was — and I still am — convinced that this question was rightly answered in the negative. Consequently, I found it neither necessary nor opportune to express my disagreement in respect of the Court’s observation that these two immunities ‘lie at the heart of the notion of fair procedure’. I now do: I feel that this high-strung qualification — which is repeated in paragraph 68 of the present judgment — is somewhat exaggerating the weight of both rights, more particularly that of the privilege against self-incrimination.

I think that, historically, both rights must be seen as the very negation of the old, inquisitorial notion that a confession is an indispensable condition for conviction and therefore must, if need be, be extorted. These immunities thus served the purpose of preventing suspects from being subjected to improper* [3] physical or psychological pressure. I accept that both rights — and more especially the right to remain silent — still serve this purpose. Also today it remains necessary to protect suspects under custodial police questioning against such pressure.

I also accept that since there is a not negligible chance that statements made under pressure may be unreliable, the rationale of the immunities under discussion comprises — as the Court put it — the avoidance of miscarriages of justice.

Furthermore, I accept that there is a certain link between these immunities and the presumptio innocentiae as enshrined in Article 6 § 2 in so far as they allow an accused not only to keep silent during police interrogation but also to refuse to answer questions of investigating or trial judges as well as to give evidence himself* [4] .

However, these rationales hardly justify the Court’s qualification of these two immunities as lying ‘at the heart of’ the notion of fair procedure’. I therefore suspect that other, not explicitly mentioned, rationales have contributed to that qualification.

In this context I note that legal writers and courts have frequently accepted a further rationale* [5] . Its formulations vary, but they all essentially boil down to the proposition that respect for human dignity and autonomy requires that every suspect should be completely free to decide which attitude he will adopt with respect to the criminal charges against him. On this view it would be improper, because incompatible with such respect, to compel an accused to cooperate in whatever way in bringing about his own conviction. This rationale often seems to be the main justification for the broader privilege against self-incrimination.

The present judgment strongly suggests that the Court now has embraced this view. A first argument for this interpretation is that in the second sentence of paragraph 68 it repeats the rationale given in Murray (see paragraph 6 above) but — by prefacing its quotation by the words ’inter alia’ — underlines that this is only part of the rationale of the two immunities. A second and still more telling argument is the stress laid, both in the last sentence of paragraph 68 and in paragraph 69, on the will of the accused: the Court now underlines that the privilege against self incrimination is primarily concerned ‘with respecting the will of an accused person’. That comes very near to the rationale outlined above which allies both immunities to respect due to human dignity and autonomy.

I do not, of course, deny that there is an element of truth in this view, but I am inclined to think that its weight should not be exaggerated. ‘Human dignity and autonomy’ have an absolute ring, but in our modern societies it must remain possible to protect the community against forms of crime, the effective combatting of which makes it imperious to compel (specific categories of) suspects to cooperate in bringing about their own conviction. I believe that especially the broader privilege against self-incrimination may be restricted by law in order to protect legitimate interests of the community. In my opinion it is, in principle, open to the national law to compel (specific categories of) suspects by threat of punishment to contribute passively or actively to the creation of evidence, even decisive evidence, against themselves. Suspects may be compelled to allow or even to co-operate in the taking of fingerprints, in the taking of blood for alcohol-tests, in the taking of bodily samples for DNA-tests or to blow in order to ascertain whether they are drunken drivers. In all such and similar cases national legislatures are, in my opinion, in principle free to decide that the general interest in bringing about the truth and in bringing culprits to justice shall take precedence over the privilege against self-incrimination* [6] .

I fear that the impugned qualification of both immunities (as lying ‘at the heart of the notion of fair procedure’) as well as the newly advanced rationale tying them to respecting ‘human dignity’ imply that, in the Court’s opinion, the privilege against self-incrimination is far more absolute than it is in my view.

But for paragraph 69 of the present judgment — to be discussed in paragraph 12 below — I would have added that this difference of appreciation might also be illustrated by the above-mentioned Funke judgment. What was at stake in that case was not so much the right to remain silent as the privilege against self-incrimination, for Funke refused to hand over (possibly) incriminating documents. The Commission had, in my opinion rightly, concluded that the legitimate interests of the community overrode the privilege* [7] , but the Court curtly refused to follow, which strongly suggests that in its opinion there was no room for a balancing exercise at all. It is worth while noting that the reasoning subsequently given in the Murray judgment, namely its reliance on generally recognised international standards* [8] — does certainly not justify this decision: both under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution* [9] and under the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities* [10] there is a right to remain silent, but in principle not a right to refuse to hand over documents, let alone an absolute right to do so.

It is, however, at least open to doubt whether the Court in paragraph 69 of its present judgment has not — implicitly, without saying so openly, let alone without adducing cogent reasons for doing so — overruled Funke and has essentially converted to the more restricted doctrine adopted inter alia by the Court of Justice. In this context it is significant that § 69 refers to how the privilege against self-incrimination is understood ‘in the legal systems of the Contracting States and elsewhere’. What is more important is that, whilst the first sentence of paragraph 69 seems to amalgamate the privilege against self-incrimination with the right to remain silent, the second sentence seems to imply that — contrary to Funke — the privilege does not comprise the power to refuse to hand over incriminating documents nor that to prevent the use of such documents, obtained under compulsion, in criminal proceedings.

I confess that I fail to see another possible construction of paragraph 69 so that I presume that the above interpretation is correct. On that assumption two points should be made.

The first is that the merging of the conceptually broader right not to incriminate oneself with the right to remain silent reduces the scope of protection afforded to suspects. In my understanding of the privilege against self-incrimination the Court retains the power to control national legislation and practice which it has forfeited under its present doctrine.

The second point is that it is — to put it mildly — open to grave doubt whether the distinction made between the licence to use in criminal proceedings material which has ‘an existence independent from the will of the suspect’ and the prohibition of such use of material which has been obtained ‘in defiance of his will’ is a sound one. Why should a suspect be free from coercion to make incriminating statements but not from coercion to cooperate to furnish incriminating data? The Court’s newly adopted rationale does not justify the distinction since in both cases the will of the suspect is not respected in that he is forced to bring about his own conviction. Moreover, the yardstick proposed is not without problems: can it really be said that the results of a breath test to which a person suspected of driving under the influence has been compelled have an existence independent of the will of the suspect? And what about a pin code or a password into a cryptographic system which are hidden in the suspect’s memory?

In sum: I cannot accept the new doctrine. I stick to the notion of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent being two separate, albeit related, immunities which allow for limitations.

II Further delineating the issue

A

It is high time, after these introductory remarks of a general nature, that I turn to the case at hand.

In doing so a first point to make is that it is of the utmost importance to keep in mind that in this case two stages should be clearly and carefully distinguished: at a first stage Mr Saunders had to appear before the DTI Inspectors and only at a second stage did he have to face trial.

It is important to carefully distinguish both stages since Article 6 applies to the second stage only. The reason is that during the first stage Mr Saunders was not yet ’‘charged with a criminal offence’ within the autonomous meaning of this expression in Article 6’* [11] .

Although, strictly speaking, paragraph 67 of the Court’s judgment only reminds us that neither Mr Saunders nor the Commission have alleged otherwise, its wording and especially the reference to the Deweer judgment* [12] make it clear that a majority within the majority subscribes to this proposition.

Why was Mr Saunders not yet ‘charged’ during this first stage? Simply because he had not yet received an ‘official notice given to an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence’* [13] .

Admittedly, a charge ‘may in some instances take the form of other measures which carry the implication of such an allegation and which likewise substantially affect the situation of the suspect’* [14] . It might, therefore, be argued that the inquiry before the DTI Inspectors was a form of such ’other measures’ which: (1) in view of the purpose of the inquiry and the circumstances of the case, carried the implication that Mr Saunders, who was a director of Guinness at the time of the bidding, was suspected of having committed a criminal offence and (2) was affecting his situation of suspect as substantially as if a criminal investigation had be ordered against him.

There is, however, nor merit in this argument since just as there is no ‘charge’ if the ‘official notice’ is not given by ‘the competent authorities’ — that is, by the competent prosecuting authorities —, so there is no ‘charge’ if the ‘other measures’ do not emanate from the competent prosecuting authorities. It is common ground, however, that the inquiry before the DTI Inspectors — apart from being, essentially, investigative* [15] — did not emanate from or was taken over by the prosecuting authorities* [16] .

It follows, firstly, that the fact that Mr Saunders was not entitled during this first stage to refuse to answer incriminating questions did not give rise to any violation of his rights under Article 6, especially not the right to remain silent of the privilege against self-incrimination.

Secondly, it follows that the essential issue in the present case is where someone has made incriminating statements in the context of an inquiry during which he is obliged to answer any and all questions on pain of fine or imprisonment, whether it would be compatible with the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination to allow the use of these statements as evidence against him at his trial* [17] .

B

As already indicated in paragraph 2 above this is an important issue.

Our modern societies are ‘information-societies’, also in the sense that all of us, government agencies as well as citizens, to a large extent depend on various kinds of information, notably on information provided by (other) citizens. This applies in particular to government agencies: countless administrative decisions — whether imposing a duty or granting a favour — are based on such information. Information which simply cannot always be verified beforehand. One must, therefore, be able to rely on the veracity of such information. However, the old virtue of truthfulness has largely disappeared from modern morals. We have become ‘calculating citizens’, putting our own interests above those of the community. No wonder that fraud in multiple forms is the bane of our societies: fraud in the field of taxes* [18] and social security, fraud in the field of governmental subventions, fraud in the environmental sphere (illegal disposal of dangerous waste), fraud in the sphere of the arms trade and drugs (money-laundering), fraud in the corporate sphere which may imply any species of the other frauds just mentioned. Frauds that are all the more tempting since our computerised world with its manifold cryptographic devices makes it much easier to effectively hide them* [19] .

It is generally accepted, therefore, that the mere threat of penal and other sanctions does not suffice, but that regular random as well as special pro-active audits, inspections and investigations by highly specialised agencies are indispensable for effectively combating such frauds. The auditors not only need expert knowledge, they also cannot do without ‘appropriate special powers’* [20] . That normally includes not only the right to inspect correspondence and files, to verify books and accounts, but also to require a certain degree of active cooperation* [21] by those under investigation, to be informed of passwords and other secret information, to secure the handing over of documents and replies to questions. Normally, such rights are enforceable by threat of punishment.

Hence — and because, obviously, such audits may imperceptibly evolve into a criminal investigation — there is an inherent conflict with the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination.

This conflict may be solved in various ways and I think that we should realise that, even in a given legal system, different solutions may coexist.

Legislatures whose starting point for such audits is the idea that ascertaining the truth is the weightier interest and, consequently, deny those under investigation the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination by making it an offence not to answer questions or otherwise to refuse cooperation, have several options concerning the use in evidence of the material thus acquired in subsequent criminal proceedings against those who have been under investigation. Sometimes it is provided that such material cannot be used in evidence at all; sometimes, that such material may only be used in evidence in case of a prosecution for perjury; sometimes it may also be used when a person who has been under investigation, in criminal proceedings against him, gives evidence which is incompatible with the material in question; sometimes the material may be used in evidence unless the trial court finds that under the circumstances such use would be unfair. The present case is an example of the latter type of solution: whilst paragraphs 1 and 3 of Section 434 of the 1985 Act* [22] leave no doubt that this provision concerns the type of investigation discussed in paragraph 16 above, paragraph 5 of that provision explicitly allows the use in evidence of answers given to the DTI Inspectors.

It follows that the main issue in the present case is whether paragraph 5 of Section 434 of the 1985 Act is incompatible per se with the right to silence or the privilege against self-incrimination. In view of what I have said in paragraph 17 above on audits it is difficult to deny that this issue is of general importance. The more so since holding that paragraph 5 of section 434 of the 1985 Act is incompatible per se with the right to silence or the privilege against self-incrimination may, as a matter of inherent logic, entail that (since no use may be made of the answers of those who have been under investigation by DTI Inspectors) the very same prohibition affects facts discovered in consequence of such answers, such as the existence of a foreign bank account or of a secret file!

III Deciding the issue(s)

In trying to decide the main issue my starting-point is that I accept that the United Kingdom legislature — which in such matters should be allowed a certain margin of appreciation — could reasonably conclude that, where there are serious rumours of fraudulent management, the public interest of protecting society against such fraud demands that the truth comes out and that this justifies the system of inquiry as set up under in the 1985 Act, a system under which officers and agents of the investigated company are obliged to cooperate with the DTI Inspectors as laid down in Section 434 of that Act, without enjoying the immunities under discussion.

A first point to make is that paragraph 5 of Section 434 of the 1985 Act pre-supposes that the answers are incriminating: it allows their use in evidence ’against him’.

A second point to make is that, although at first blush it may appear that what is a stake is not the right to silence, but rather the privilege against self-incrimination, further analysis suggests that both rights are equally implied: on this view what is in issue is whether it is permissible to use in evidence answers obtained in an investigation in respect of which the legislator has deliberately set aside both the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination (see the text of sections 434 and 436 of the 1985 Act).

I confess that I have hesitated somewhat in deciding the main issue. However, in the end I have come to the conclusion that I had not been persuaded that paragraph 5 of Section 434 of the 1985 Act is incompatible per se with the right to silence or the — broader — privilege against self-incrimination. It is only fair to say that in this decision the serious consequences of the latter view indicated at the end of paragraph 19 above have played their part.

As already indicated in paragraphs 7–12 above, I see neither right as absolute and I therefore fundamentally disagree with the sweeping statement in paragraph 74 of the Court’s judgment according to which ‘the public interest cannot be invoked to justify the use of answers compulsory obtained in a non-judicial investigation to incriminate the accused during the trial proceedings’.

I accept that at the trial of a driver accused of driving when intoxicated the outcome of a breathalyser-test to which he had been compelled may be used in evidence against him, although it has been obtained as a result of the legislature’s setting aside the privilege against self-incrimination. Why, then, should it per se be inadmissible to use in evidence statements obtained as a result of a similar setting aside both of the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination?

As far as the rationale for these immunities is to provide the accused with protection against improper compulsion by the authorities and, thereby, to contribute to avoiding miscarriages of justice, their rationale does not require to hold that paragraph 5 of Section 434 of the 1985 Act is inadmissible per se: the impartiality of the DTI Inspectors who merely seek to establish the truth, their professional qualities — generally speaking senior barristers and accountants —, the procedure before them, based as it is on natural justice under control of the courts, and, finally, the circumstance that those under investigation are given advance notice in writing of what is required from them and may be accompanied by their lawyers* [23] , seem to offer sufficient guarantees against improper physical or psychological pressure, whilst the power of the trial judge under section 78 of PACE* [24] constitutes a further guarantee against unfairness arising from the inquisitorial nature of their inquiry as well as against any residual danger of miscarriage of justice.

Nor does the argument as to ‘human dignity and autonomy’, compel one to conclude that the use in evidence of the answers given in the inquiry is per se inadmissible. As I have already indicated, this rationale is also to be relativised and there is special justification for doing so in the present context. After all, under the hypothesis we are discussing, the answers are ’incriminating’. That means that they to a certain extent disclose both the offence and its perpetrator. The question therefore comes down to asking whether that disclosure may be used when trying to bring that perpetrator to justice. Would it not be stretching the respect for his human dignity and autonomy — or, in the terminology of the Court, the respect for his will — too far to hold that the mere fact that he has made these ‘disclosing’ statements in the context of an inquiry during which he did enjoy neither immunity necessarily results in making any and all use of such answers in evidence against him inadmissible per se?

I think that this question should at any rate be answered in the affirmative if making any and all use of such answers in evidence inadmissible per se, it would imply that there is a good chance that — although to a certain extent it had already been disclosed that he was the perpetrator — he would nevertheless go unpunished which — as I am prepared to accept* [25] — in practice would be the effect in a good many of these complicated fraud cases. I find it rather difficult to accept that once the result of the investigation is that such frauds are exposed, the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination should, nevertheless, make it to all practical purposes impossible that those whose responsibility is to a certain extent already disclosed are brought to justice and punished. This would lead to undermining the deterrent function of the criminal law in an area where it is particularly needed and, furthermore, seriously offend the public’s sense of justice.

There is one further argument against the admissibility of legislation of the present type that must be discussed separately since it apparently impressed the Commission and, accordingly, has been — succesfully* [26] — urged by counsel for the applicant in his pleadings before the Court.

I recall that we are discussing a two tier type legislation, characterised by (1) establishing investigation proceedings in which those under investigation are obliged to cooperate with the investigators and to answer their questions without enjoying the two immunities under discussion (the first tier) and (2) making it, moreover, possible that answers obtained in those investigation proceedings be used in evidence at a subsequent trial against someone who has been under investigation (the second tier). The overall justification of this type of legislation is to protect the public against serious forms of fraud. That public interest justifies, firstly, setting aside the immunities under discussion in the first tier (the investigation stage) and, secondly, using the answers in the second tier (the trial stage) in order to make sure that, where the first tier has disclosed a perpetrator, that perpetrator gets his punishment in the second tier. Seen from the latter’s viewpoint, however, the whole process nullifies the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination.

The argument to be discussed claims that if a two tier process, which amounts to nullifying these immunities for the sake of protecting the public against serious forms of fraud, is to be condoned, such a two tier process must also be accepted if on similar arguments — that is: on the argument that public interest in being protected against robbery, violence, murder etc. etc. outweighs these very same immunities — it is established in respect of ordinary crimes. Which would, obviously, be the end of the two immunities under discussion.

The argument is flawed in that it disregards a difference between the various forms of serious fraud and such ordinary crimes as robbery, violence and murder which in the present context is essential: In ordinary crime cases discovery of the crime nearly always precedes the investigation which, consequently, as a rule merely aims at establishing ‘who did it’; whilst in fraud cases the investigation generally has as its first and main purpose to establish whether or not a crime has been committed at all. This difference is essential since it explains why investigations into ordinary crimes as a rule come within the ambit of Article 6, whilst investigations in the field of possible fraud do not: those who are targeted by investigations of the former type as a rule ipso facto become ‘charged with a criminal offence’ within the autonomous meaning of this expression in Article 6, whilst those who who are under an investigation into possible fraud do not, and, therefore, may, without violation of Article 6, be denied the privileges under discussion in the first tier.

As to the second tier, where a charge has been brought so that Article 6 ipso facto applies always, there are sound arguments for distinguishing corporate fraud from other species of crime. First, there are important typological differences between the often well bred, highly sophisticated corporate wrongdoer and other criminals and, secondly, there is the essential feature which these forms of fraud share and sets them apart from other species of crime, namely that generally they are only detectable after an investigation of the type referred in paragraph 17 above and, moreover, may only successfully prosecuted when the results of that investigation may be used in evidence against the wrongdoer.

For these reasons the argument fails. So does a similar objection from the applicant which puts the same argument in the form of alleged discrimination between ‘corporate criminals’ who are deprived of the two immunities under discussion and ‘ordinary criminals’ who enjoy them. The differences just mentioned imply that the cases are not similar, whilst the argument moreover fails to take into account the essential difference between the very urbane proceedings before the DTI Inspectors and custodial police questioning.

My conclusion that paragraph 5 of Section 434 of the 1985 Act is not incompatible per se with the two immunities does not, of course, exempt me from examining whether under the specific circumstances of the case the use of the applicant’s answers to the DTI Inspectors was nevertheless unfair. This is what the Government called the factual issue.

In this respect I recall: (1) that under section 78 of the PACE* [27] it was for the trial judge to see to it that use of these answers did not have ‘such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it; (2) that the trial judge held two extensive voir dires on the subject at the end of which he gave rulings which demonstrated preparedness to use his powers under the provision as well as sensitivity for the interests of the defence — inter alia by excluding the evidence from the eighth and ninth interviews* [28] — and (3) that the trial judge, in his summing up — which was qualified by the Court of Appeal as ‘in the main a masterly exposition’* [29] —, compared and contrasted what the applicant had said in court with his answers to the DTI Inspectors, thereby demonstrating that he did not consider such use unfair* [30] .

Apparently, Mr Saunders has not been able to persuade the Court of Appeal that the trial judge has been remiss in guarding the fairness of the proceedings. Nor have been I been so persuaded.

In paragraph 72 the Court attaches much weight to the fact that at a certain stage of the trial — days 45–47 — the transcripts of the interviews* [31] were read to the jury. I recall, however, that right from the beginning of the trial Mr Saunders’ defence was, essentially, that whatever fraud had taken place, he was innocent because ignorant. He maintained that he knew nothing about giving of indemnities or the paying of success fees and that he had not been consulted on such matters. The transcripts made it possible to refute this defence and were used to do so* [32] .

I therefore find that — whatever is the exact meaning of the Court of Appeal’s rather approximate remark that the interviews ‘formed a significant part of the prosecution case’* [33] — Mr Saunder’s answers to the DTI Inspectors were only used in evidence against him, essentially, in order to demonstrate that the evidence which he had chosen to give at his trial was not reliable in that it was incompatible on certain points with those answers. I do not consider that to have been an unfair use of those answers.

For the above reasons I have voted against finding a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 6.

Noot

In dit belangrijke, door de grote kamer gewezen arrest staat opnieuw het nemo tenetur-beginsel centraal. Het gaat daarbij om twee verschillende kwesties. De eerste betreft de welbekende problematiek van de spreekplicht versus het zwijgrecht: hoe verhouden de inlichtingenplichten die in bepaalde situaties op burgers rusten, zich tot het zwijgrecht dat zij als verdachte hebben? Op dit punt schenkt het Hof klare wijn. Verklaringen die een burger gedwongen was af te leggen, mogen niet in een strafproces tegen hem gebruikt worden. Het publieke belang kan, ongeacht de aard van de telastegelegde feiten, dergelijk gebruik niet rechtvaardigen. Zie daarover de punten 2 en 3 van deze noot.

De tweede kwestie heeft betrekking op de reikwijdte van the right not to incriminate oneself. In hoeverre gaat het om méér dan het zwijgrecht alleen? Het Hof overweegt dat het recht zich niet uitstrekt tot het gebruik van afgedwongen bewijsmateriaal dat onafhankelijk van de wil van de verdachte bestaat, en noemt daarbij als voorbeelden inbeslaggenomen documenten, uitgeademde lucht (blaasproef), bloed‑ en urinemonsters en lichaamsweefsel voor DNA-onderzoek. Dat is een belangrijke overweging, omdat het hier gaat om onderzoek waaraan de verdachte niet zelden verplicht is mee te weren, en het na het Funke-arrest (NJ 1993, 485) de vraag was of dergelijke verplichtingen stroken met het verdrag. Het Hof heeft dit arrest kennelijk aangegrepen om de ontstane onrust weg te nemen. De gekozen bewoordingen lijken aan duidelijkheid niets te wensen over te laten. Toch is het juist de absoluutheid van de formulering die vragen oproept. In het Funke-arrest ging het immers om de verplichte overhandiging van documenten, om materiaal dus waarvan het bestaan niet afhankelijk was van de wil van de verdachte. Moet aangenomen worden dat het Hof teruggekomen is op zijn in het Funke-arrest ingenomen standpunt? Zie nader de punten 4, 5 en 6 van deze noot.

Op last van het Britse ministerie van handel en industrie werd een onderzoek ingesteld naar mogelijke beursfraude met betrekking tot aandelen Guinness. Saunders, de (gewezen) hoofddirecteur van het concern, werd in het kader van dat onderzoek gehoord en was daarbij wettelijk verplicht op de gestelde vragen te antwoorden. Die spreekplicht stond in het arrest niet ter discussie. Aangezien het onderzoek geen strafvorderlijk karakter had (niet was gericht op de ‘determination of a criminal charge’), was art. 6 EVRM daarop niet van toepassing. De vraag was alleen, of het gebruik van de afgelegde verklaringen in de latere strafzaak zich verdroeg met het zwijgrecht dat daarin aan Saunders toekwam (§ 67). Die vraag werd door het Hof met een duidelijk nee beantwoord.

De gekozen benadering maakt duidelijk dat een inlichtingenplicht als zodanig niet in strijd is met art. 6 EVRM. De overheid mag een burger verplichten inlichtingen te geven, ook als deze zich daardoor zou incrimineren. Het conflict tussen spreekplicht en zwijgrecht behoeft derhalve niet te worden opgelost door de burger een verschoningsrecht te geven in gevallen waarin hij zich door te antwoorden aan het gevaar van een strafvervolging zou bloot stellen. Het voordeel van de benadering van het Hof is, dat aan de informatiegaring voor andere dan strafrechtelijke doeleinden geen beperkingen worden gesteld. De overheid mag van de belastende informatie gebruik maken, ook ten nadele van de betrokkene, zolang maar geen sprake is van gebruik als bewijsmateriaal bij de vaststelling van een criminal charge. Ingeval van geconstateerde belastingfraude bijvoorbeeld kunnen de inlichtingen die de belastingplichtige verplicht was te geven, wel gebruikt worden om de belastingaanslag te corrigeren, maar niet om een fiscale boete op te leggen of, ingeval van een strafvervolging, om het bewijs van het telastegelegde te leveren.

In het verlengde van het voorgaande ligt, dat art. 6 EVRM er niet toe dwingt om de spreekplicht op te heffen als het redelijk vermoeden rijst dat de betrokkene zich schuldig heeft gemaakt aan een strafbaar feit. Als de ondervraging zich niet richt op de vraag of een punitieve sanctie moet worden opgelegd, behoeft aan de ondervraagde geen zwijgrecht te worden toegekend. De belastinginspecteur die fraude constateert kan, als hij alleen uit is op een correcte aanslag, de cautie achterwege laten. Omdat de ondervraging niet plaats vindt in een strafvorderlijk kader, en de belastingplichtige dus niet als verdachte wordt gehoord, is art. 29 Sv niet van toepassing. Het gevaar voor misbruik is daarbij niet groot: als de ondervraging wel (mede) bedoeld is om strafrechtelijk bewijs te leveren, is het in het belang van het onderzoek zelf dat de spreekplicht in een zo vroeg mogelijk stadium wordt opgeheven. De afgelegde verklaringen zijn anders immers niet bruikbaar.

De conclusie kan zijn dat het onderhavige arrest de oplossing die door Wattel is verdedigd (preadvies NJV 1995, p. 214 e.v.), in één klap heeft gerealiseerd. Zie ook E.E.V. Lenos, NJB 1997, p. 795 e.v.

Over het verbod om onder dwang afgelegde verklaringen in het strafproces te bezigen, nog een tweetal opmerkingen. De eerste is dat het verbod blijkens het arrest niet alleen geldt voor bekentenissen. Saunders had steeds hardnekkig ontkend, maar die ontkennende verklaringen waren, vanwege tegenstrijdigheden en feitelijke onjuistheden, voor hem belastend. Daarbij moet wel bedacht worden dat het in casu ging om juryrechtspraak. In de Nederlandse verhoudingen zal het enkele op de zitting ter sprake brengen van onvrijwillig afgelegde verklaringen, niet direct een incriminerend gebruik van die verklaringen opleveren. Van de beroepsrechter mag worden verwacht dat hij geen onbruikbaar bewijsmateriaal in zijn oordeelsvorming betrekt.

De tweede opmerking betreft de absoluutheid van het verbod. In zijn dissenting opinion stelt Morenilla dat hij zich kan vinden in het meerderheidsstandpunt, volgens hetwelk de onvrijwillig afgelegde verklaringen wél door de vervolgende autoriteiten zouden mogen worden gebruikt als basis voor verder (opsporings)onderzoek. In het arrest is dat standpunt echter niet direct terug te vinden. Weliswaar beperkt het Hof zijn oordeel tot gebruik ‘during the trial proceedings’ (§ 74), maar om een verdergaand oordeel vroeg de casus niet. Of het verbod ook voor het vooronderzoek geldt, zal dus moeten worden afgewacht.

Het Hof overweegt dat het recht om geen bewijs tegen zich zelf te leveren, zich niet uitstrekt tot bewijsmateriaal waarvan het bestaan niet afhankelijk is van de wil van de verdachte. Dat zou betekenen dat aan het recht nauwelijks nog zelfstandige betekenis toekomt naast het zwijgrecht. Kan van bewijsmateriaal dat zich niet ‘in’ het hoofd van de verdachte bevindt, immers niet steeds gezegd worden dat het onafhankelijk van diens wil bestaat? Het enige bewijsmateriaal dat — voorzover ik kan bedenken — afhankelijk is van de wil van de verdachte is zijn spreken en zijn zwijgen. Het privilege against self incrimination zou zich dus beperken tot de vrijheid om al dan niet een verklaring af te leggen.

Nu is enige twijfel mogelijk over de vraag of deze verregaande beperking inderdaad door het Hof is bedoeld. Dat de zaak aan de grote kamer is voorgelegd zou er op kunnen wijzen dat men op Funke heeft willen terugkomen. Daar staat echter tegenover dat dit punt niet expliciet bij de beraadslagingen aan de orde lijkt te zijn geweest. In elk geval weet ook Martens, zoals uit zijn dissenting opinion (§ 12) blijkt, niet zeker wat de meerderheid heeft bewogen. Enige voorzichtigheid bij het trekken van conclusies lijkt derhalve te zijn geboden. Daarbij moet rekening worden gehouden met de mogelijkheid dat het Hof aansluiting heeft willen zoeken bij de rechtspraak van het Amerikaanse Supreme Court. Een beschrijving van die rechtspraak geeft P. Bal in J.M. Reijntjes (red.), Nemo tenetur, Arnhem, 1996, p. 23 e.v. Reijntjes wijst er in diezelfde bundel (p. 17 e.v.) op dat het Hof in het uiterst summier gemotiveerde Funke-arrest voorop stelt dat de autoriteiten niet zeker wisten of de opgevraagde documenten wel bestonden. Dat past in de Amerikaanse jurisprudentie waarin aangenomen wordt dat ingeval van de gedwongen onthulling van het bestaan van de documenten, wel degelijk sprake kan zijn van bewijs van testimonial or communicative nature. Het Funke-arrest zou zogezien dus niet zijn overruled, maar alleen, naar nu blijkt, verkeerd zijn begrepen. Zie Schalken in zijn noot onder NJ 1997, 232 en Lenos, t.a.p., p. 796. Deze uitleg roept dan wel direct de vraag op, hoe groot de ruimte is die het Hof laat voor een tot de verdachte gericht bevel tot uitlevering van documenten. Wanneer weten autoriteiten zeker dat een bepaald document nog bestaat?

Op de achtergrond speelt een discussie over de rechtsgrond van het nemo tenetur-beginsel. Uit het arrest is wel de conclusie getrokken dat het Hof het beginsel heeft verengd tot een kwestie met betrekking tot de betrouwbaarheid van het bewijsmateriaal. Afgedwongen verklaringen kunnen onbetrouwbaar zijn, documenten en lichaamsmateriaal worden er niet minder betrouwbaar op als ze onvrijwillig zijn afgestaan. Zie DD 1997, p. 402. De enige rechtsgrond zou in deze visie het tegengaan van rechterlijke dwalingen zijn. Opmerkelijk is dat Martens in zijn dissenting opinion (§ 9) juist vermoedt dat het Hof de rechtsgrond heeft verruimd tot ‘respect for human dignity and autonomy’. De verabsolutering waartoe deze rechtsgrond uitnodigt, zou zijns inziens tot de beperking van de reikwijdte van het beginsel hebben geleid.

Ik meen dat de zorg voor de betrouwbaarheid van het bewijs een te beperkte rechtsgrond oplevert. Zelfs het zwijgrecht kan daarmee niet goed verklaard worden. Als het gaat om verhoren op het politiebureau is het zwijgrecht inderdaad een waarborg tegen afgedwongen bekentenissen. Bij verhoren op een openbare terechtzitting, waarbij de verdachte wordt bijgestaan door een raadsman, is het gevaar voor improper compulsion niet erg groot. Dat de enkele plicht tot spreken er toe leidt dat de verdachte ten onrechte bekent, valt niet direct in te zien. De kans dat een bekentenis niet deugt is natuurlijk altijd aanwezig. Dat echter rechtvaardigt geen absoluut zwijgrecht. Waarborgen met betrekking tot het gebruik van de afgelegde verklaringen (bijv. het bewijs mag daarop niet mainly steunen) zouden voldoende garantie kunnen bieden tegen rechterlijke dwalingen. Ik merk daarbij op dat getuigen in het strafproces wél gedwongen kunnen worden om onder ede verklaringen af te leggen. Toch wordt niet aangenomen dat die dwang hun verklaringen onbetrouwbaar maakt. Integendeel, spreekplichten vinden hun rechtvaardiging altijd in het feit dat daarzonder de waarheid niet op tafel komt. Een parlementaire enquêtecommissie bijv. zou nergens blijven als de personen die zij wil horen, geen spreekplicht hadden. Is het dan niet vreemd om in de waarheidsvinding, die spreekplichten rechtvaardigt, de basis voor het zwijgrecht te zoeken?

In het verlengde van het voorgaande ligt, dat het zwijgrecht niet gebaseerd kan worden op de onschuldpresumptie. Uit die presumptie volgt wél dat de verdachte zijn onschuld niet behoeft te bewijzen, en dus óók dat de vervolgende overheid het bewijs van schuld moet leveren, maar niet dat die overheid dat bewijs niet zou mogen leveren door de verdachte tot medewerking te dwingen. Als die medewerking betrouwbaar bewijs oplevert, wordt aan de onschuldpresumptie niet tekort gedaan. Er is, zoals het Hof in LXVIII stelt, wel een link tussen het recht zich zelf niet te incrimineren en de onschuldpresumptie, haar het verband is net andersom: dat de overheid het bewijs op eigen kracht moet leveren, vooronderstelt dat de verdachte niet tot medewerking kan worden gedwongen.

Opgemerkt kan worden dat de onschuldpresumptie ook daarom als rechtsgrond ontoereikend is, omdat daarmee niet verklaard kan worden dat het zwijgrecht zich (althans naar Nederlands recht) niet beperkt tot de schuldvraag. Waarom behoeft een verdachte op geen enkele vraag antwoord te geven, dus ook niet op vragen die betrekking hebben op de procesgang of op de straftoemeting. Waarom zou een verdachte die ruiterlijk bekent, er verder het zwijgen toe mogen doen? Met de betrouwbaarheid van het bewijs en met de onschuldpresumptie kan het zwijgrecht niet ten volle verklaard worden. Mijns inziens dient de verklaring mee, zo niet in de eerste plaats, gezocht te worden in het feit dat de verdachte in het strafproces geen voorwerp van onderzoek is, maar een partijpositie inneemt. Het is de vrijheid om de eigen procesopstelling te bepalen die het Hof tot ‘the heart of the notion of a fair procedure’ rekent. Daarbij zij aangetekend dat deze keuze voor het eerste lid van art. 6 als basis, meebrengt dat ook in het civiele proces aan de partijen vrijheid dient toe te komen. Het verschil is alleen dat die partijautonomie in het burgerlijk proces (die zo ver gaat dat de partijwaarheid boven de materiële waarheid wordt gesteld) niet of nauwelijks onder druk staat. In het strafproces daarentegen is de vraag in hoeverre het publieke belang een inperking of relativering van de partijautonomie rechtvaardigt.

Het is begrijpelijk dat het Hof de verklaringsvrijheid als de kern van het nemo tenetur-beginsel aanmerkt. Die verklaringsvrijheid is essentieel voor de vrijheid die de verdachte als procespartij toekomt. Bovendien gaat respect voor partijautonomie hier hand in hand met het voorkomen van ontoelaatbare druk, en daarmee van onbetrouwbare bekentenissen. Dat maakt tevens begrijpelijk dat buiten die ‘harde’ kern plaats is voor relativering van de partijautonomie. Daarbij dient bedacht te worden dat — naar algemeen wordt aanvaard — in het strafproces aan de vervolgende overheid (ingrijpende) onderzoeksbevoegdheden ter beschikking staan. Dat maakt dat die overheid bewijsmateriaal waarvan het bestaan niet afhankelijk is van de wil van de verdachte, dikwijls ook zonder diens medewerking kan achterhalen. De inbreuk op de vrijheid van de verdachte kan dan echter groter zijn dan bij een verplichting tot medewerking het geval is. Als bijv. de verdachte bloedafname eenvoudig heeft te gedogen, kan die afname desnoods met fysiek geweld worden afgedwongen. Een constructie waarbij de verdachte verplicht wordt om mee te werken geeft de verdachte feitelijk een keuzemogelijkheid: hij kan de bloedproef weigeren en daarmee voorkomen. Meewerkplichten zijn zogezien juist heel goed te rijmen met respect voor de vrijheid van de verdachte.

Een en ander maakt dat de beperking waarvoor het Hof lijkt te hebben gekozen, niet onverdedigbaar is. Een meer genuanceerde oplossing, waarbij inbreuken op de partijautonomie die niet in de sfeer van de verklaringsvrijheid liggen, op redelijkheid worden getoetst, zou echter mijn voorkeur hebben. Vgl. de dissenting opinion (§ 10) van Martens. Overigens is het niet zo dat het Hof, als vast gehouden wordt aan de gekozen oplossing, geheel met lege handen staat. Een meewerkplicht zal bijna altijd een inbreuk op de privacy betekenen die aan het tweede lid van art. 8 EVRM dient te worden getoetst. De vraag daarbij is hoe de necessity-eis zal worden ingevuld. Zal een verplichting om aan de eigen veroordeling mee te werken minder snel ‘noodzakelijk’ worden geacht dan een verplichting om aan andermans veroordeling mee te werken? Als dat het geval is wordt door de achterdeur binnen gehaald wat aan de voordeur is buiten gesloten. Zou het dan niet beter zijn gewoon de voordeur open te zetten?

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EHRM 17-12-1996, NJ 1997, 699 Saunders